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On the Reconciliation of Economic and Political Perspectives on Policy: An Examination of the Relationship between Past Policies and the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009

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ABSTRACT: *This study examines the impact of incentives and constraints on public policy. The base for this examination is set by Thomas Sowell's argument that, through a preliminary focus on created incentives and constraints, the results of certain types of policies can be more easily and reliably predicted. Additionally, that through recognition of such effects, more effective policy might be formulated. The benefits of this perspective are demonstrated through analysis of two historical policies: ethanol consumption and affordable housing measures. The study then applies this approach to the recent American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA). In order to divine true incentive and constraints of this stimulative measure the study investigates some original intentions and rationales inherent in stimulative measures in the work of John Maynard Keynes. The true rationales of these types of stimulative measures are identified within each section of the ARRA so that a more comprehensive view of its stimulative and non-stimulative measures might be recognized.*

> "You know, doing what is right is easy. The problem is knowing what is right."
>
> —*President Lyndon Baines Johnson*

In *Economics of Social Issues*, the writers put President Johnson's observation another way: "People often expect more of their governments than those governments can provide. And governments often promise more than they are able to deliver." (Sharp, 2008, p. 23) By the very nature of this phenomenon, it is fair to say that we as a society have yet to agree, whether by interpretation of moral obligation, historical record, and so forth, about what exactly the role of government should be, and much less about how best to enact their "responsibilities." One hindrance is a lack of focus. A possible answer to this is a focus on something more static and consistent between models of government that vary in ideology, perceived responsibility, and how they achieve that responsibility, that is, how they reach desired goals.

Consider a personal example. Suppose you see something you want. It is not that desirability which determines if you get that item, but the price, and then your evaluation of its value to you and if that value is great enough to be expressed in the form of currency and payment. The payment represents to others that its value is great enough to warrant the cost. You signify, through your desire to pay the price, your willingness to place the item in a category beyond the reach of others. Thus your cost is the representation of alternative uses which are denied to others. Desirability, then, in that decision-making process plays a relatively small part.

Why then, when seeking desires at a national level, is the focus almost exclusively on desirability rather than all that is inherent, affected, and represented in the procedure of obtaining what is desired? It is little coincidence that when considering government policy formulation the discussion turns to economics. Economist Thomas Sowell points out two reasons for this: "In . . . politics . . . issues can be framed in terms of the desirability of various goals, such as 'affordable housing' . . . The economics . . . can only make us aware of the costs of our goals." (Sowell, 2004, p. 126–127) Notice, just as with the parallel in the individual purchase scenario, the bulk of the decision-making process is determined by

what would be lost. Likewise Sowell points to the same situation in policy making: "Economics was christened the 'dismal science' because it dealt with inescapable constraints and painful trade-offs, instead of the more pleasant and unbound visions, and their accompanying rhetoric, which many find so attractive." (p. 127)

In today's society, where politics and economic impact are more closely related than ever before, one must not consider them separate fields of study but inherently intertwined when discussing policy formulation and evaluation. This interplay of perceptions in the public arena is currently lacking. This has resulted in many shortcomings over the years—not just individual incidences, but larger paradigm shifts. Two aspects discussed in this paper are 1) the phenomenon in policy formulation of catering to ideology and demagoguery over effect and 2) the concerns which arise when there is a weak system of policy evaluation. The theories are applied to two issues: ethanol and housing legislation. Finally this study seeks to apply this perspective to a current policy—the recent stimulus bill—in the hope that incentives and restraints involved therein can be identified. Given its scale and the space permitted here, only the broader picture of the bill will be examined in order to identify incentives and restraints according to underlying alleged ideology—specifically those of Keynesian origin.

Presented above is a series of concerns which occur when one sees something desirable on a personal scale. Why must this process be followed? Why not simply take that which is desirable? Beside the legal ramifications of this attitude, the final issue involves scarcity: a long-time economic tool and subject not frequently or commonly linked to public policy or political science in public or academic discourse. The purpose here is to advocate that, as the perceived roles and responsibilities of government enter new territory, there must be new thinking involved, a creation of a new paradigm and standards of evaluation.

What exactly is scarcity? Sowell defines scarcity as a condition in which

> everyone's desires cannot be satisfied completely, regardless of which particular economic system or government policy we choose—and regardless of whether an individual or a society is poor or prosperous. Therefore competition among people for these resources is inherent. It is not a question of whether we like or dislike competition. Scarcity means that we do not have the option to choose whether or not to have an economy in which people compete. That is the only kind of economy that is possible—

and therefore our only choice is among the particular methods that can be used for this competition. (Sowell, 2007, p. 75)

One of the implications of scarcity in a relatively free and competitive market is that prices are measurements of personal value and value to others. You pay so they cannot use a good or service. Ideally, a consumer's cost should be at least slightly greater than the value of the item represented to those to whom it was denied. Price as a tool of measurement of value, in a free market rather than control, creates several more implications. This can explain its role as a form of rationing. If a price system is not in place, rationing must occur because of scarcity, Sowell suggests that in some government policies where prices have been removed, rationing might take the form of a lottery or rotation of recipients. The difference is that it is done by someone other than the former buyer or receiver. To a certain extent, their responsibility is removed.

Two things must be recognized regarding scarcity: 1) allowance for quantifiability and 2) recognition that it affects action. Intertwined, these two allow for improved policy evaluation. In the world of policymaking, scarcity and its two key components are one ever-present package of elements which can lend itself to measurement. With this phenomenon, one begins to understand how policy within incentives and constraints, results in a more appropriate viewpoint that leads to an applicable evaluation system. This is in line with Sowell's thinking.

> The more fundamental point is that we need to know the actual characteristics of the processes set in motion—and the incentives and constraints inherent in such characteristics—rather than judging these processes by their goals. Many of the "unintended consequences" of policies and programs would have been foreseeable from the outset if these processes had been analyzed in terms of the incentives and constraints they created, instead of in terms of the desirability of the goals they proclaimed. Once we start thinking in terms of the chain of events set in motion by particular policies—and following these events beyond stage one—the world begins to look very different.
> (Sowell, 2004, p. 2)

One important point about policymaking and its relationship to economics is with regard to the scarcity of public resources and their allocation to public demands placed upon government. What are the most appropriate options to balance: demand and supply, or policy with

economics? To have one's policy demands met with full economic support must other citizens and their demands be ignored?

Consider that much of the rhetoric at our country's founding regarding rights revolved around protection *from* the government. If rights are often seen as protection from government, where do rights come from? Is a right defined as inalienable, political, economic, social, or some combination of all four? In 2003, Dennis Kucinich called clean drinking-water a right. In 2004, the Texas Clean Energy Congress called clean energy a right. We have heard from many advocates that health care should be called a right. Sowell points out the shift: "Rights in the sense of exemptions from the power of government are very different from rights to things that can be provided only by incurring costs." (Sowell, 2004, p. 26–27) When this type of rhetoric is introduced, it is clear that greater concern lies with image than substance on the part of the policy maker. One does not need to call something a "right" to advocate for meaningful policy changes.

When such claims are made, they are not inherently calling for a cost to be encumbered. Perhaps the impetus is rather that certain things should be made available. For example, is the right to freedom of speech intended to make an action available to oppose laws by the Congress which might stifle speech? When considering goods which some label as rights, what is the opposition to their availability? The obstacles are no longer the powers of the government, but scarcity. Thus the new obstacles concern technological advances, research, policy reform and policy making, recourses, labor, education, training, and manufacturing.

All are elements which incur costs. If it is the will of the people that government take on such responsibilities, even if not in the form of a cost, then citizens should not disregard them outright. Rather, the approach advocated must be evaluated by what is being sought (the goal) and the conditions that are created in crafting the policy and its implementation. This can be accomplished by defining demanded policies in terms of incentives and constraints. Thomas Sowell is not the only observer to call for such change in perception.

Phil Smith and Eric Thurman (2007) argue that good intentions do not translate into good policy. Specifically, they argue that there should be three elements in creating quality policy: 1) have a bottom line, end goal, or mission; 2) a measure of success; and 3) support of what works. In support of such methods, Thomas Dye (2008) argues that the reason for failures in both formulation and evaluation is often because there is no end

goal and no accurate and definable measure of progress. It can be argued that these alternative views proposed by Smith, Thurmond, and Dye can be consolidated into Sowell's advocacy of seeing policy in terms of incentives and constraints—thereby focusing on full comprehension of economic elements and results in policymaking. Smith and Thurman note that focus on both a goal and the intent of a policy falls when perceiving incentives. Additionally, the quantifiability found in their second and third points lends itself to Sowell's view.

Having discussed this proposed policy process exclusively in conceptual terms, two examples in particular can be demonstrated. The first is ethanol legislation. In this example and the next, we examine how catering to idealism over effect and poor policy evaluation took place, their results, and how they might have been avoided.

Ethanol legislation between 2003 and 2005 originated primarily in response to environmental concerns, but also public concerns about costs and reliance on foreign sources for energy. In response to this public sentiment—that is, desirability—several provisions were passed through various pieces of legislation. Among these provisions were the requirements that: 1) the states use five billion gallons of ethanol by 2012; 2) 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol be produced; and 3) a federal tax credit of $0.51 be awarded to consumers per gallon of ethanol used as motor fuel. (Ellis, 2009, p. 2–3) As stated, the political climate was accommodating for this type of legislation. Gasoline prices were high at the time the legislation was passed; environmental concerns were taking center stage politically. It could be alleged that when these pieces of ethanol legislation were created, the policy and economic ramifications that would result were not an issue—addressing public demand and desirability was. The consequences of the new artificial market for corn—the preferred American ethanol ingredient—were many: increases in the prices of crops due to decreased supply; poor soil conservation measures in an attempt to squeeze as many seasons of corn out of fields before the price became fluid again; and vast affect on water consumption. According to Michael Webber of the University of Texas: "The entire ethanol production cycle, from growing irrigated crops on a farm to pumping biofuels into a car, can consume 20 or more times as much water for every mile traveled than the production of gasoline." (Wythe, 2009)

Other concerns about the use of corn as ethanol dealt with the resulting net energy output. There are several different methods for creating ethanol, but regarding

net energy output—the amount of energy put into the process as compared to the energy that comes out of the process—Mathew Wald stated: "the consensus among the analysts is that even if the net energy value of ethanol is positive the margin is small." (Wald, 2007, p. 47) Indeed, depending upon the method of production and use of by products, the net energy output of ethanol can actually be negative, that is, it requires more energy to make ethanol than to use it. Clearly, if some simple steps had been taken on the part of the policymakers the original concerns could have been addressed rather than resulting in a series of unforeseen consequences, such as ethanol plants closing or filing for bankruptcy due to several realizations, among them: the acknowledgment that once the artificial demand is gone there will be little real demand left. One example of such effects is the Panda Ethanol plant in Hereford, Texas. Construction began in 2006, and was mostly completed in 2008, and now is filing for bankruptcy in 2009. (Panda, 2009) Indeed all over the county ethanol plants are closing their doors. The result of this might be that public support and investor capital, which might have been successfully implemented on efficient ethanol, has been used on one that was asked to deliver more than it was able and too soon. Overall, this might have discouraged support for ethanol in general to the point that once a viable and efficient crop and ethanol production technique is found, the reception might be one of skepticism and doubt, hurting ethanol implementation in the long run.

The second example is that of the recent housing crisis. By most accounts the current economic crisis had its seeds sown in the housing market. There were many reasons for this, but most revolve around unsafe lending practices. Whether these were motivated by greed, government incentive, lack of regulation, something not yet recognized, or some combination is not what this study seeks to investigate. What we should consider is if one item or concern was clearly to blame and if we knew it before hand. If this concern contradicted a policy which smacked of the perceived need and public desirability, would anything be done? Would our policymakers have been willfully negligent in the face of public opinion? On the 25th of September 2003, the last in a series of oversight hearings by the Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) subcommittee was held. The hearing dealt with the safety, soundness, and other lending concerns of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The following is an excerpt of an opening remark by Maxine Waters (D-CA) in subcommittee when faced with these concerns and the testimony of the regulator:

As you know I was a member of this distinguished committee when we enhanced the structure of these GSEs in 1992 to ensure safety and soundness in particularly the housing mission, however I have sat through nearly a dozen hearings where frankly we were trying to fix something that wasn't broke. Housing is the economic engine of our economy. And in no community does this engine need to work more than in mine. . . . we should do no harm to these GSEs we should be enhancing regulation not making fundamental change. Mr. Chairman we do not have a crisis at Freddie Mac and in particular at Freddie Mae under the outstanding leadership of Mr. Frank Raines. Everything in the 1992 Act has worked just fine. In fact the GSEs have exceeded their housing goals. What we need to do today is focus on the regulator and this must be done in a manner so as not to impede their [Freddie and Fannie's] affordable housing mission. A mission that has seen innovation flourish from desktop underwriting to 100% loans. (United States, 2003)

Several things that can be tied to the prior concerns in how policy is perceived present themselves here. Congresswoman Waters mentions several times the goal or the desirability of the policy. In spite of the fact that the reason for the hearings was to investigate issues of risk in lending practices; her focus was not on that at all. She mentions "enhancing" regulation, but what does that mean? Notice that in spite of the concerns voiced, she mentioned the original goal and even personalized the desirability, "in no community does this engine need to work more than in mine." This statement is very descriptive of the mindset of a growing number of policymakers. Before she can be condemned, however, one must ask why she has such perceptions. Is it because "we the people" have made our representatives answerable only to immediate desirability? Has society been unmasked as shallow and easily distracted? The incentive for policymakers is to react to the issue of the day while it is fresh on everyone's mind. They respond in such a way that the effects can be connected to a mindset which may motivate citizens to action at the polls—even though the cost for such immediacy might be policy of a lesser quality. This brings up another issue that must be addressed if we are seeking a change in the way policymakers perceive policy. The citizenry and its representatives must look at the incentives and constraints placed on them. The incentive is to react to popular demand, and to do so quickly because of the shallow and fast paced society. As seen in the ethanol and housing examples, this can lead to hastily crafted and inefficient policies.

There are two solutions to this problem. First, the policymakers must see themselves as representatives. This country is not a direct democracy for a reason. It was made a representative republic with the knowledge that sometimes a small handful of elected representatives would be able to make better policy decisions than the mass of people that make up the citizenry. A smaller group is not as easily led by emotionalism, can receive all the facts easier, and are generally entrusted to do so by their voters. Second, there must be a change in public perception. However this is probably the least likely suggestion to occur. Until the populous shows itself capable of deeper perception of political and policy actions, such policies will continue to appeal to shallow goals and desirability rather than farther reaching ramifications.

Let us attempt to apply these rather simplistic, proscribed, perceptions to an actual and ongoing policy: the recent stimulus measures. One can see some of the more complex concerns that will arise. This process will not be entirely in the spirit of Sowell because the policy has already been created, but it should be faithful in that, through examination, one can see some of the results of the policy, if not the whole picture. First, we must examine what a stimulus is and what it is intended for. John Maynard Keynes, while probably not the first to advocate government intervention during an economic crisis, probably was among the loudest to lobby for it. In *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* Keynes discusses several points pertaining to government intervention. He speaks at length about the cyclical nature of a free and competitive market; he expresses concern at down-turns. In later chapters, he discusses how monetary policy cannot always reduce the damage at the downturns of the cycle. He introduces methods which, while not capable of preventing downturns, might reduce the damage at several stages. Most of his discussions revolve around two concepts. The first is manipulating interest rates to avoid the downturn of the cycle by slowing upward growth. "There is, indeed, force in the argument that a high rate of interest is much more effective against a boom than a low rate of interest against a slump," and second, full engagement of an economy. (Keynes, 1964. p. 320) This is quite the opposite of what our own Federal Reserve did preceding this current economic crisis. The term "engagement" is specific to this research and coined in order to incorporate several of Keynes's points. He speaks of the inefficiencies of an economy not operating at full consumption and production, which some might say is an inevitability of a free market, that is, one without planners. However, he does

not try to change that aspect universally, but suggests it as a way to reduce damage at the downturn of the economic cycle by engaging the economy to its full potential even though in a downturn that potential to be tapped might be decreased drastically. The policy ramifications come into play where he believes such engagement, to combat under-consumption, should come from:

> When once the recovery has been started, the manner in which it feeds on itself and cumulates is obvious. But during the downward phase, when both fixed capital and stocks of materials are for the time being redundant and working-capital is being reduced, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital may fall so low that it can scarcely be corrected, so as to secure a satisfactory rate of new investment, by any practicable reduction in the rate of interest. Thus with markets organized and influenced as they are at present, the market estimation of the marginal efficiency of capital may suffer such enormously wide fluctuations that it cannot be sufficiently offset by corresponding fluctuations in the rate of interest. Moreover, the corresponding movements in the stock-market may . . . depress the propensity to consume just when it is most needed. In conditions of *laissez-faire* the avoidance of wide fluctuations in employment may, therefore prove impossible without a far-reaching change in the psychology of investment markets such as there is no reason to expect. I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot be left in private hands.
> (Keynes, 1964, p. 319–320)

That line of reasoning is the basis from which a vast swathe of intervention policy has originated. This of course means that policymakers are not actually making new policy; they are copying or recreating policy. So let us consider the original intent, incentives, and constraints of the policy, and what Keynesianism is and is not. Only when we have a clear picture of the policy can we then seek its possible results through incentives and constraints created. Economist Luigi Zingales recently participated in a debate sponsored by *The Economist* in which he discussed Keynesian principles. He to sought at the very onset of discussion to solidify the concept:

> What does "being Keynesian" mean? Simply believing in the role of demand-side factors in the determination of aggregate output is an insufficient characterization. A true Keynesian differs, in so much as he also believes that: 1) monetary policy is not the most effective tool for stabilizing the economy and it may be completely ineffective

in some circumstances (liquidity trap); 2) fiscal policy is effective and government spending is the preferred tool; 3) government intervention works and short-run consequences are more important than long-run ones.

(Atkeson, 2009, p. 2)

During the course of discussion, a problem arose which was fairly non-contested by several members—most notably Zingales and Brad DeLong. A similar somewhat "Keynesian" policy had been enacted leading up to the economic crisis: "I do not think that than any economist would dare to say that the current US economic crisis has been caused by under-consumption . . . the Bush administration has run one of the most aggressive Keynesian policies in history." (Atkeson, 2009, p. 2) Two quick notes for our correct perception and application of this policy: 1) consider what is the problem that this Keynesian ideal seeks to solve; 2) what scope should it have? Regarding scope, we are considering less than a continuous policy since to seek constant maximum consumption and employment through government intervention and stimulus is a known fallacy. While elaborating on the first item, DeLong might actually address the second issue satisfactorily. DeLong who played the part of loyal opposition to Zingales in the public debate offered to define the crisis, eliminating the room for misunderstanding or misconception:

> What is the crisis? The crisis comes in six stages: 1) American mortgage originators lose $2 trillion due to their irrational exuberance investing in mortgages. 2) American mortgage securitizes who are supposed to follow an originate-and-distribute model in order to lay off the risk associated with mortgages lending onto the broad pool of savers in the global economy originate but do not distribute. 3) As a result, a large share of the $2 trillion in losses falls onto and must be eaten by Wall Street's largest institutions. 4) In response to these losses, trust in financial intermediaries and thus the risk of tolerance of the private sector collapses—with $2 trillion in mortgage losses inducing a stampede away from risky assets that ultimately lowers the global value of financial assets by $30 trillion and renders nearly all if not all major financial institutions insolvent (at least temporarily insolvent). 5) Businesses that ought to be expanding thus find that they cannot obtain financing on terms that make expansion profitable—while businesses that ought to be contracting still contract. 6) Thus employment collapses.

(Atkeson, 2009, p. 4)

Using these principles as a starting point, this study sought to establish what constituted Keynesian application: analysis of discourse between scholars, the direct teachings of Keynes, and historical application. To this end, one major instance of Keynesian application, the Great Depression, was examined. Amity Shlaes, in *The Forgotten Man,* details a very revealing history of the Great Depression and New Deal. In Shlaes' account, Keynesian policy in America was a great experiment. Shlaes' descriptions support Zingales' assertion that Keynesian philosophy focused on the short term, increasing consumption via government spending. Shlaes offers an interesting side note regarding incentives: "Keynesian provided the intellectual justification [to spend] and the creation of constituencies." (Shlaes, 2008, p. 11) As a stop gap, Shlaes might agree that Keynesian philosophy provided some relief; she cites that in 1936, government consumption increased from 6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) to 9%, and that unemployment increased from 14% from 22%. This was higher than the highest levels of the early 1920s. (Shlaes, 2008, p. 267) So then, one must consider the policy only as a temporary fix to a down-turned economic cycle. After presenting the five issues which led to the collapse, DeLong, an advocate of Keynesian stimulus, made the comment that:

> Professor Zingales says that having the government spend more money and raise less in taxes won't deal with 1-5—that in order to fix the banking system "we need to fix the banking system." He is 100% correct: Keynesian policies won't deal with 1-5, and we desperately need to deal with 1-5. But we can limit the damage.   (Atkeson, 2009, p. 2)

The hope is to limit the damage of the cycle. Using all the information gleaned, the stimulus should be targeted at engagement of current capability. It must be outside monetary policy and targeted at an existing, non-engaged, workforce. Before looking at direct application, one must examine why Keynesian philosophy as an enduring policy is undesirable. Again we examine the Depression. In the 1930s, taxes began to be raised by Roosevelt to unprecedented heights to address the new policies of high spending. In a system run by those who respond to interest groups, some negative situations arose:

> the idea of 'reform through taxation' . . . would send businessmen into 'paroxysm of fright.' At Chase, Benjamin Anderson was preparing a bulletin that tried to capture the longer-term economic damage that could result from Morgenthau's undistributed profits tax. The idea that cor-

porate surpluses were bad, Anderson would write . . . was sheer fallacy. . . . Whatever recoveries the market and the economy were making, both were still behind. How would the Henry Fords of the 1930s succeed if they were not permitted to plow their profits back into the business.

(Shlaes, 2008, p. 272)

This was a major downfall of Keynesian philosophy as an ongoing policy, and according to Keynes's contemporaries, even as a recovery measure or stimulus. Allan Meltzer, an authority on Keynes, makes important distinctions between Keynes and those that followed after him. One example is how "Keynesians" argue for government directed investing, which has differed from Keynes as far as one of the causes of economies operating at less that maximum consumption. The notion was that "markets charged a risk premium paid by both the lender and the investor. This premium could be eliminated, an externality removed, by letting the state direct investment. A reduced risk premium meant the real rate of interest would fall to the social rate of return." (Atkeson, 2009, p. 3) Mr. Meltzer points out that one of the largest criticisms against Keynesian economics actually comes from the Keynesians themselves.

> Modern political economy departs from Keynes by treating public officials like everyone else. They are rational, maximizing individuals. They may be concerned about the redistributive effect of their policies and decisions. But they are not concerned only with the public's welfare. Politics in a modern state is about who pays and who receives. Would we have the current financial crisis if Congress had not subsidized home ownership and eliminated down payments beyond the point of absurdity?
>
> (Atkeson, 2009, p. 3)

This is a view that must be considered. Keynes believed that his planning would only be safe if the hearts and minds of those policymakers enacting it were strictly focused on what was best for the whole, not the desirability of a section of society. Consider Keynes opinion of Friedrich Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, which some call the most compelling and complete argument for free market enterprise, Keynes wrote that in his "opinion it is a grand book . . . morally and philosophically I find myself in agreement with virtually the whole of it: and not only agreement with it, but in deeply moved agreement." (Hazlett, 1992) In their last conversation, Hayek asked Keynes if he was concerned about the expanded interventionist direction some of his pupils were taking with

his ideas. Keynes replied: "Oh they're just fools. These ideas were frightfully important in the 1930's, but if these ideas ever become dangerous you can trust me—I'm going to turn public opinion around." (Hazlett, 1992) This conversation happened about three weeks before Keynes's death. Along with the testimony of Hayek and Dr. Meltzen, this type of situation, and bias in planning, was a natural result of Keynesian philosophy when not put in the hands of devout public servants without the extensive economic training that Keynes had originally planned. Keynes warned Roosevelt of this. "It is a mistake to think that businessmen are more immoral than politicians." (Shlaes, 2008, p. 338) This is something of a detour, but there are two reasons for mentioning this quote in relation to clearly conceptualizing a policy in order to perceive incentive and constraints. First, it prompts one to ask two questions: 1) "Is it ethical to misrepresent, deliberately or not, an ideal which is required as justification when putting forward a motion which is only seen as favorable when it rests on the unambiguous principles of said ideal?" 2) "What might such efforts of unintentional misrepresentation have on the result of the policy in terms of what good might have been done if a policy true to the ideal were enacted?"

With this background let us look at an actual policy implementation in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) stimulus bill. Here we can look for this type of targeted response that would instigate immediate engagement and consumption. Enacted on February 17, 2009, the ARRA was the latest measure by the American government to try and stimulate the economy from its downward spiral. It followed several measures by the Bush administration that sought the same goal, including the Troubled Assets Relief Program. This is the stage of research where scholarly judgment comes into play. The methodology—using what we have established about Keynesian philosophy, its goals, focuses, and boundaries as a stop-gap measure to prevent damage from an economic down turn—was to go line by line through the ARRA bill and identify which measures were, elements of Keynesian philosophy or not. This is done because we have established that one of the steps in ascertaining incentives and constraints is to establish clearly goals and intent. "To stimulate" is Keynesian, therefore we need to see if the entire bill is clearly Keynesian. As one might probably guess, that is not entirely the case. We must see which items of the bill would constitute Keynesian philosophy and to what extent.

Due to the bill's large size and wording, it was useful to find studies which broke the bill into parts, then judge

each part. Five studies from five different sources were examined: *New York Times*, *ProPublica*, The Democratic Policy Committee, the House Committee on Appropriations, and the House Committee on Ways and Means. The methodology was simple: go line by line through the respective studies and identify if each item constituted genuine Keynesian ideology or not.

Several elements were considered with each item. Among them were: 1) whether the item would have clear and direct effect on increasing consumption, and 2) whether the focus was on engaging current capability and therefore current consumption, which was not being fully utilized. This would address concerns of under-consumption. It was here that many distinctions were made between an item that was clearly meant for economic impact and one that was not. It is important that the desirability of an item should have no effect on judgment. There were many worthy programs present in the analysis but they simply did not demonstrate clear Keynesian principles. Another advantage of categorization was the ability to see if the implementation timeframe involved was long term or short term. The rate of implementation might have a considerable economic impact at some undetermined point in the future. These policies are not Keynesian because they do not seek to reduce immediate damage from the economic downturn. Finally, categorizing policies into those with clear Keynesian terms and those which were not, created a third category area of items which were not clearly Keynesian but also not "un-Keynesian,"—a grey category. The bill allocated approximately $787 billion in measures to stimulate the economy.

Each study differed slightly because of differences in how many credits or extensions of programs might utilize funds. Several interesting distinctions were seen when the results of the individual studies were compared. The *New York Times* study broke the bill into 126 items, of these it found that approximately $400 billion of the items clearly constituted Keynesian policy, $317 billion did not, and $58 billion in items comprised a grey area (Hossain, 2009). The *ProPublica* study broke the bill into 377 items across two reports, one for spending the other for tax measures. Of these approximately $364 billion of items clearly constituted Keynesian policy, $391 billion did not, and there was approximately $32 billion in the grey area (Grabell, 2009).

Before addressing the other three studies, one can see a noticeable difference. There is also a greater breakdown in the Propublica study than the *New York Times* study. This allowed for a smaller grey area, $32 billion, in the *ProPublica* study versus a $58 billion grey area in the

Times. The Democratic Policy Committee study, while insightful, did not apply a line-by-line breakdown; instead, the study broke down the stimulus into effects by state. The bill was divided into approximately 1,940 items across fifty states, and while interesting, the study did a poor job of faithfully assigning exclusive values; some values overlapped. There was still some value in the size and scope of the projects; the breakdown was still useful because it seemed to reach similar conclusions as the *ProPublica* and *New York Times* studies.

The final two studies consulted were put out by the House Ways and Means Committee and the House Committee on Appropriations. The two studies must be considered in concert, as the Appropriations Committee Study took into account only "targeted priority investments" or actual funds spent. The Ways and Means study examined tax measures. Some issues, such as their time periods, made these two studies difficult to reconcile. The Ways and Means study considered every item in terms of how much the item would cost over a 10 year period as tax policy, while the Appropriations breakdown did not give a time line but simply a dollar amount for each item. Overall these two studies reported that far more money was involved than actually released in the bill. This was due to the differences in scope and time considered. These two studies are still of use however, because percentages of pure Keynesian policy items could be compared to the *New York Times* and *ProPublica* studies. The Appropriations study, which broke the bill into approximately 182 parts, found $211 billion constituted clear Keynesian policy, $269 did not, while there was about $92.15 billion in a grey area (United States Appropriations, 2009). The Ways and Mean study, which broke the bill into approximately 72 parts, found that $264 billion constituted clear Keynesian policy, $193 billion did not, and there was approximately $10.038 billion gray zone (United States Ways, 2009).

The interesting thing about these studies is the comparison of percentages. In every study, the parts that clearly constituted Keynesian were approximately 45.67%. This percentage is fairly consistent. In the Propublica study, the percentage of clear Keynesian items was approximately 46.2%. In the *New York Times* study the percentage was approximately 51.9%. This is interesting because approximately half of the provisions are geared towards spurring consumption, and rely on Keynesian ideology, that is, about half is targeted and half is not. Some argue that the recent problem was not one of consumption but of trust. Based on that argument, some might say that the targeting of stimulus is not necessary.

However, one cannot deny that more damage has been done to some industries than others, and therefore, we must target the response of policies as Keynes proscribed. Even if the problem is not under-consumption, Keynesian theory does not allow for simply wanton spending. Policymakers on whole have trouble with this because of the demands of constituencies. This has certainly been evident in the past when considering other measures of stimulus. Consider the $700 Billion stimulus of last fall. When asked where the number came from, a Treasury spokeswoman said: "It's not based on any particular data point . . . we just wanted to choose a really large number" (Wingfield, 2008). Some say, this lack of Keynsian focus is also found in the ARRA bill as well, as reported by the Cato Institute:

> The December unemployment rate was only 2.3% for government workers and 3.8% in education and health. Unemployment rates in manufacturing and construction, by contrast, were 8.3% and 15.2% respectively. Yet 39% of the $550 billion in the bill would go to state and local governments. Another 17.3% would go to health and education—sectors where relatively secure government jobs are also prevalent. (Reynolds, 2009)

The example of Congresswoman Waters demonstrates the danger of perspectives in which idealism blinds one to adverse affects. However, there are some measures (approximately half) targeting the consumption problem—and therefore the public trust problem. What does this mean? More importantly, what does this mean as an incentive for resolving our current economic mess? We have identified this current policy as, at least partly, in the spirit of Keynes. We have reviewed the last viable policy, still true to the intent of Keynes: 1) a bandage policy meant, not to outright avoid downturns but, to reduce damage in the downturn of a cycle; 2) specifically targeted and considered policy—free of political bias; 3) directed by objective experts (Keynes envisioned economists) which seek public good over the ability to extend influence through opinion or sphere of governance; 4) the intent to engage an economy to its fullest capacity. Let's go back to what was discussed in the *Economist* debate. Both sides agreed that the problem was not one of consumption—the past deficits attested to that—but rather trust, trust that the cycle would continue on. It would be safe to say then that the bill will stem some damage. Doing anything visible to solve the problem will have an effect and will raise trust. Similarly, one must consider DeLong's position that the stimulus will not target any of the causes of the crisis satisfactorily. What it can do is stem the damage, according to Keynes, by engaging consumption. This is the sole purpose of his policy during the downward trend of the trade cycle, not to seek the abolishment the cycle altogether. This stance is shared by both Hayek and Keynes and is pointed out by Caldwell of Duke University:

> The dangers both Hayek and Keynes recognize is if the stimulus goes for too long because that sets up that sort of inflationary period so in many peoples' minds the question boils down to this: 'Will Washington have the requisite knowledge and political will to start reducing the stimulus at just the right time?' . . . and I think that is a scary question. (Goodwin, 2009)

Our efforts to divine incentives and effects can go only as far as we have determined their intentions, or what we have been able to deem true Keynesian policy. As an incentive, the 46–51% of this bill deemed Keynesian should have some effect on the consumption issue and therefore, even if it is minor, it should in turn affect issues of trust, if not in terms of public perception, then in terms of the government not having to continue drastic acts and undermine investor confidence. However, the policymakers have used the other half of the bill as a chance to cater to political idealism and constituencies. Since this study does not seek to categorize the remaining items, and therefore the subsequent incentives, intentions, and results in the bill, we can only consider the percentages deemed Keynesian, and hope that the non-Keynesian items do not undermine their stimulative counterparts. Those items' potential benefit, if enacted, should be feasibly attained. Just as Keynes himself had an understanding of the implications of his policy, we too must recognize what is Keynesian and is not, lest the very tempting implications of it grab hold of policy to our detriment. A perception in terms of incentives and constraints allows for this. The desirability talked about by Sowell is of paramount concern when critics of Keynes bring up issues of Keynesian philosophy leading to the creation of constituencies. Keynes also recognized the danger; this was demonstrated in his emphasis on the application of Keynesian policy in the hands of experts who have no other motivation than the societal good.

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The Complex Dynamics between German Citizens and Turkish Immigrants

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abstract: *This article examines the latest immigration trends into Western Europe, particularly the immigration of Turks to Germany. The origins of Turkish immigration and German immigration law are reviewed. Turkey's bid for European Union membership is examined historically and opinions about how this potential European Union member has caused controversy and how Turkey could change the face of the European Union will be discussed. Attitudes of German citizens toward immigrants are examined using data from the European Values Survey (EVS). Tests show that religion and possibly education level play a role in determining the attitude of German citizens toward immigrants, the majority of whom are Turkish.*

Introduction[1]

Immigration has always raised concerns for sovereign states. Among these concerns: immigrants may refuse to assimilate, they may decrease the standard of living, crime rates might increase, or they may take jobs away from non-immigrant citizens. One famous focal point of these concerns is along the southern border of the United States and Mexico, but in other areas of the world immigration is just as controversial an issue as it is on the North American Continent.

Western Europe has been experiencing an immigration surge, primarily individuals from underdeveloped Muslim states in the Middle East. Since the 1950s the Muslim population has exploded in Europe, surging from near nothing in 1950, to 50 million in 2009, roughly 7% of the population. France and Germany have been particularly affected, possessing nearly 6 and 3 million Muslims respectively (Kirkwood, 2009). The governments of Western Europe have shown increasing concern attempting to maintain their own unique lifestyle and cultural identity, while also ensuring that human rights and free speech are respected. Still, many citizens of the European Union (E.U.), and the states that comprise it, have concerns about increased immigration. One of the largest segments of the immigrant community comes from Turkey, a secular Muslim state that is currently vying for acceptance into the European Union.

This article will attempt to provide valid and salient information about how citizens of E.U. states, specifically Germany, feel about immigration from Muslim states, Turkey in particular, but will also examine attitudes toward Turkey's proposed ascension as a member state of the European Union itself. If accepted, Turkey would dramatically alter the demography of the European Union and redefine what it means to be European.

History of Turkish Immigration, German Immigration Laws, and Reform

As the twentieth century progressed, incentives for increased immigration to Europe began to be felt in the Middle East and in Turkey. After WWII, and particularly after the separation of East and West Germany by the Berlin wall in 1961, increased labor shortages, especially in lower class occupations, motivated West Germany to introduce a guest worker (*Gastarbeiter*) program to fill the labor need. The vast majority of workers that immigrated to Germany were Turks (Horn, 2007). Initially these guest workers were allowed into Germany on condition that they would return to their country of origin within three to five years. This arrangement was mutually beneficial. Germany could fill its labor need, while Turks could come to Germany for better wages, a higher standard of living, and improved healthcare. Some even came to escape persecution in their native country or to seek asylum (Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil, & Polit, 2005).

Unfortunately for Germany, many of the *Gastarbeiter* stayed after their welcome had worn out. The immigrants who did stay in Germany soon were allowed permission for their families to immigrate as well. With immigrant families reunited, soon there were second and third gen-

eration immigrants being born within Germany. One author recounted the old cynic's saying, "'there is nothing more permanent than temporary migration,'" ("Be My Guest," 2005).

Many researchers have studied reasons that Turkish immigrants have given for either remaining in Germany or returning home to Turkey (Anil, 2007; Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil & Polit, 2005; Doerschler, 2006). Doerschler (2006) provides a simple and near comprehensive list of motives for immigration. Among these are: 1) economic conditions, typically migration from a country with a low economic standard to a higher one for financial gain, 2) political factors, such as suppressed human rights, persecution, and promise of extended liberty in host country, and 3) social contacts in the host country pressure family and friends to immigrate from the native country to the host country. By contrast, Razum et al. (2005) provided motives of Turkish immigrants who may choose to return to their home country. Like a foil to Doerschler's research, the motives to return home typically include a failure to realize one of the goals for initial immigration. Turks may have failed to realize the economic success they had anticipated, so they return home. Other factors for returning to the homeland include the loss of social relations and status, or feeling ostracized; family members may have remained in Turkey; a high risk of occupational hazards; and some even reported that they would prefer to live in an environment that promotes Islam. Out of the some 2 million Turks living in Germany, around 40,000 return to Turkey each year (Razum et al., 2005).

Since the early 1900's, German immigration laws have never made the process of immigration easy. Until the immigration reform of 1999, German citizenship was based strictly on German bloodline (Akturk, 2007). The 1913 immigration laws were a drastic departure from the pre-1913 imperialist rules. Before 1913, the citizenship of ethnic Germans who had lived outside of the country more than ten years was revoked, while immigrants of different ethnicities were allowed citizenship after living in Germany. This changed as the Pan-German League gained influence. After 1913, immigration laws changed focus from determining citizenship based on place of residence to German ethnicity (Acturk, 2007). These sentiments carried through until the end of WWII when the Allies occupied West Germany and the Soviets the East.

After the reunification and stabilization of Germany, the government began taking a closer look at immigration problems. Naturalization rates for foreigners within Germany never exceeded 3% before 1999. This figure was astonishingly low; however the remarkable fact about this statistic was not the low rate of naturalization. An estimated one fifth of these foreigners living in Germany were born on German soil to immigrants who had begun to reside in the country earlier in the century (Anil, 2007). Unlike the United States, German immigration law before 1999 did not include the principle of *jus soli*; in other words, just because someone was born on German soil they were not granted automatic citizenship rights. Liberal German politicians worked to reform the immigration laws. The result was the Citizenship Reform of 1999. Anil (2007) describes the specifics of the reform:

> The 1999 amendment established a minimum requirement of eight years without any age restrictions and set forth criteria an applicant should meet to be naturalised . . . the 1999 changes introduced birthright citizenship *(jus soli)* for the first time in German history. Under the new citizenship policy, a person born in Germany to a foreign parent who has resided in Germany lawfully for eight years or has held an unlimited residency permit for at least three years, is automatically granted German citizenship. Those who are granted German citizenship at birth are allowed to have dual citizenship; however, they have to choose which citizenship to retain before the age of 23.
>
> (p. 1363–1364)

While the Citizenship Reform of 1999 was a triumph for immigrants and progressives, many Germans felt threatened by the increasing number of Turkish immigrants pouring into the country. European birthrate was and remains very low. So low in fact, that the peoples of France, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain are not producing enough offspring to replenish the natural rate of population decline; however, increased immigration and the high birthrate common among immigrants indicates that there will soon be a dramatic shift in European demography. Some estimate that by 2050 Europe will become a land with a Muslim majority (Kirkwood, 2009). It is safe to assume that many Germans feel that immigrants threaten their national identity. After all, a Germany that is not the land of beer and schnitzel, but instead dominated by towering mosques and calls to prayer would not seem like Germany at all. Conservative German politicians are concerned about this trend and we can be sure that we will see attempts to retain their own national identity while maintaining the delicate balance of free speech and human rights.

Progress and Opposition toward Turkey's entry into the European Union

Turkey's courtship with the European Union began long ago. In 1963, the European Economic Community (EEC), one of the predecessors to the European Union, signed the Association Agreement with Turkey in Ankara. The agreement came in the midst of the Cold War. Turkey was seen as an essential ally by the West against the Soviet Union, but as Turkey moved to implement the stipulations of the agreement and continue to work with the EEC further, the Cold War ended. It seemed that Turkey's value had been reevaluated. In 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, their plea was largely ignored. Some in the European community cited the substandard human rights conditions in Turkey as an excuse for refusing to consider membership. Since 1987, Turkey's relationship with the EEC, and later the European Union, has been inconsistent at best. The European Union did not even bother inviting Turkey to the Luxemburg Summit in 1997. Official candidacy of Turkey was recognized by the Helenski European Council in December 1999, however after September 11, 2001, it appeared that the West had reconsidered Turkey's value in the European Union (Tekin, 2005). In October 2005, negotiations were re-opened for Turkey's ascension, however judging from the history of Turkey's E.U. bid, it appears that Turkey is only an attractive candidate for the European Union depending on the benefit they can bring to the West, especially when relating to or resisting Western foes.

Resistance to Turkey's ascension into the European Union is strong particularly in France and Germany. Quantitative evidence of this claim has been seen at the polls in each country. Yilmaz (2007) explains that other scholars conducted a series of tests rating the popularity of potential candidates to the European Union. Respondents from a number of E.U. states, including France and Germany, were asked to rank the other states on a scale from 0 (*no affection*) to 100 (*full affection*). Turkey faired poorly on this scale, scoring only a 42. Only two other states scored lower: Palestine rated 38 (even though Palestine is not officially a sovereign state) and Iran rated 28 (Yilmaz, 2007).

What are the specific objections against Turkey's E.U. bid? Answers are varied. One of the most common is that Turkey simply does not meet the requirements for E.U. membership. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council established the modern criteria for all states interested in joining the European Union. The "Copenhagen criteria," as they became known, had a few major stipulations including: 1) "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," 2) "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union," and 3) "the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union." Additional criteria were established a few years later at the Madrid European Council in December 1995 (European Commission Ascension Criteria, 2009).

Turkey has been making progress meeting the obligations and criteria of the European Union, however there is much work remaining before all the criteria are met. The Commission of the European Communities records the progress of potential E.U. candidates on a yearly basis. According to the report, "Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures implemented," however, measures that are pending or have not been brought before Parliament are not included (Commission of the European Communities, p. 4). The Commission identified two main areas in which Turkey must make progress to fulfill the E.U. ascension criteria: political and economic.

Progress in the political criteria involves a number of different areas that range from human rights to democratization. Progress to meet the political criteria of the European Union has been significant, but the Commission specified that the central government had not given enough power to local provinces. Because democracy is one of the cornerstones of the European Union, local governments require an increased ability to influence citizens to participate on the local level while assuring a high level of accountability, transparency, and avoiding corruption (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). One key concern is the relationship between civilian politicians and the military. As the Commission's report indicates, "Overall, no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure. Senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit," (p. 9).

Perhaps one of the largest concerns for the European Union is the condition of human rights in Turkey. The Commission of the European Communities (2008) report on Turkey contains 17 pages related to Turkey's progress, or lack thereof, with regard to the human rights conditions within Turkey. To put the length of the recommendations in perspective, the report on Turkey's en-

tire economic progress was only five pages long, making the human rights concerns three times longer. Some key human rights changes that must be made include ratification of important human rights treaties, equal access to legal representation, increased freedom of religion, and gender equality. Overall, Turkey has made progress, but there is much more to be done to meet all of the established Copenhagen criteria.

Conservatives in the government maintain a more vehement stance against Turkey's entry into the European Union. They typically express three fundamental differences that would prevent Turkey from ever entering the European Union as a full member. These objections are based on geography, history, and religion. The geographical objection is simple: Turkey is geographically not included within the confines of Europe, but is, rather, part of the Middle East or Western Asia; therefore Turkey should not be considered as a member, at least not a fully fledged member, of the European Union based strictly on geography (Yilmaz, 2007). Critics of this position are keen to point out that there are many other states that can be subjectively included or excluded from Europe. Russia, for example, spans a great distance, well into what most people define as Asia. These critics see Turkey as a key gateway to the East, one in which the European Union has a great stake. When determining if a state should be included in the broad definition of Europe, factors besides geography must be included as well.

Another factor used to determine the "Europeness" of a state depends on historical context. One reason Russia is included in the definition of Europe is a complex and culturally rich exchange of ideas, literature, and art between Russia and the rest of Europe. Turkey, however, also has historical ties to the Europe, particularly present during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman control of Constantinople was also influential in establishing a background in Christendom and Western culture; however, even during the time of the Ottomans, the region's primary religion was Islam. The region provides a difficult assessment for those trying to conceive of a dividing line between the West and the East. Turkey is by no means completely Western in its history and culture, but it also has many differences from some of its more Muslim neighbor states. Recalling the influential work of Samuel P. Huntington, author Ali Tekin writes, "Turkish leaders, 'having rejected Mecca, and being rejected by Brussels,' often describe Turkey as a 'bridge' between two cultures and civilisations, physically and philosophically . . . 'a bridge, however, is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither,'" (Tekin, 2005, p. 295–296).

The major and most controversial topic that conservatives use to justify exclusion of Turkey from the European Union is religion. Although Turkey is officially a secular state, some fear that the Islamic majority has molded the government, convincing them to adopt laws in line with *Sharia*, a fundamentalist, traditional, Islamic code. Some Western theorists suggest that Islam and Christianity cannot co-exist in a democracy when one religion, in this case Islam, attempts to force upon others a theocratic form of government. In other words, Europe's background in Judeo Christian morals is diametrically opposed to Islamic morals which do not promote democracy at all but rather misogyny, xenophobia, and intolerance. As author Katherine Pratt Ewing describes it, "Today much of the Western world, including some of its most influential leaders, recognizes 'Islamic civilization' as the only serious challenge to the hegemony of 'Western values.'" This concern is not new. The previously mentioned Samuel Huntington was one of the first to write about the coming clash of cultures (Pratt Ewing, 2003, p. 406). Turkish citizens and others in government also do not deny the extreme influence of Islam in Turkish culture and national identity. In 1986, the Turkish government declared that, "religion, Islam, is one of the core elements of the Turkish culture . . . religion should be the basis upon which the norms and values of society can be easily established," (Bilir, 2004, p. 263). Many influential religious leaders and politicians continue to hold the view that, "'Turkishness' and Islam go hand in hand," (Bilir, 2004, p. 266).

A religious backlash of sorts seems to be developing in Western Europe against Islamic practices. The theory of this author is that these measures taken against Muslims are a reaction motivated by self preservation. Europeans want to retain their national identity, an identity that has always been tied to their region that is now being threatened by immigrants. The problem with these actions is apparent: in an attempt to preserve their national identity, native Europeans could actually violate their progressive Western values. By singling out the Muslim minority for legislative action they could undermine the democratic values of equal rights; ironically, this is the very thing of which they accuse the Muslim community.

On November 30, 2009, the Swiss government held a referendum considering whether or not minarets—the tall spire usually capped with a crescent on Islamic mosques—should be banned. Surprisingly, the referendum passed overwhelmingly with 57.5% of Swiss vot-

ers approving of the ban. Twenty-two of Switzerland's 26 cantons also approved of the referendum, adding the ban on minarets to the Swiss Constitution, (Higgins, 2009). Resistance to the ban is increasing. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, said that the ban amounted to no more than oppression of religion. "It is an expression of intolerance, and I detest intolerance." Many expect this referendum to be overturned by either the Swiss Supreme Court or by the European Convention on Human Rights (Jordans, 2009). Protests developed spontaneously. Demonstrators wielded banners proclaiming: "Das ist nicht meine Schweitz" (This is not my Switzerland).

In the early part of the twenty-first century, many politicians in Europe actively supported Turkey's bid for E.U. membership. Gerhardt Schröder and Jacques Chirac, the heads of state for Germany and France respectively, went against popular sentiments as they lobbied for Turkey's successful membership. It was their opinion, in Schröder's words that, "Such historic decisions cannot be made dependent on the whims of changing polls and referendums," (Schoen, 2008 p. 345). However, in the 2005 German Federal Election, Schröder was not re-elected. Instead the popular leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Angela Merkel, was elected as German Chancellor. Merkel and her coalition took a more conservative stance on Turkey's potential rise to the European Union. Likewise, in France, Chirac lost his bid for re-election to Nicolas Sarkozy, another conservative who offered more resistance to the idea of the European Union with Turkey included.

A backlash against progressive immigration policy seems to be growing in Europe. Did the liberal stance of Chirac and Gerhardt lead to their loss at the polls? Harald Schoen says yes. Schoen conducted a quantitative analysis of the 2005 German federal election to determine if the public's attitude toward Turkey as a potential member of the European Union affected how they voted. Schoen concluded that the average German voter was concerned about what view politicians had toward Turkey and the European Union, and this view influenced their vote. Overall, more support for Turkey to enter the European Union by a candidate translated into fewer votes from the members of CDU, Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a lethal combination for former Chancellor Schröder's political career. Of course, Turkey's entry into the European Union was not the sole factor determining the outcome of the election, but it was a significant contributor to the end result.

The 2005 German Federal Election made apparent that German citizens care about whether or not Turkey will enter the European Union. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Germans are opposed to Turkey's entry into the European Union, but do ethnic Germans within Germany also hold a negative attitude toward Turkish immigrants themselves, and if so, what explains these attitudes? It is the hypothesis of this author that several factors will play a significant role in explaining the attitude of German citizens toward Turkish immigrants. Based on the religious differences between the two cultures, one should expect religious affiliation to play a significant role. Another important factor that could explain these attitudes is the socioeconomic situation of the respondent. Those earning fewer wages may feel anger toward Turkish immigrants for rapidly filling blue collar occupations, and in essence, "stealing" these jobs from ethnic German workers. A higher education level could provide another good predictor. Individuals with higher education tend to drift left on the political spectrum; this results in more support of immigration. Age could be another key predictor. Older Germans are likely to remember a time when there were fewer immigrants and may even remember the original *Gastarbeiter* program. This could relate to negative attitudes toward immigrants. Younger Germans, on the other hand, seem to be more liberal and tolerant than their parents and grandparents. Finally, gender may play a factor, though evidence to support this claim is modest. Based on gender stereotypes, women would have higher levels of support for immigrants while males would have greater hostility.

Data and Methodology

The data for this analysis were drawn from the European Values Study (EVS) 1999/2000, released 2, May 2006,[2] and were made available online through ZACAT–GESIS Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften.[3] The EVS is carried out by the European Values Study Foundation and is, "a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program. It covers the fields: religion and morality, politics, work and leisure, and primary relations," (ZACAT, 2009). This particular data set was gathered from a random sample of individuals living in Germany. Data were collected during a sit down interview. This author was unable to ascertain if this sample included only German citizens or also those staying in Germany temporarily and others that had been naturalized. Samples form urban and rural areas were also included. The sam-

Table 1. Explaining the Variance of German Citizens' Willingness to Help Immigrants.

	Beta	*p*
Religious Denomination	-.186	.000*
Sex	.008	.864
Age	-.014	.780
Education Level	-.016	.766
Interview Town Size	.060	.229

*Signicant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.

   N=410
   R^2=.036
   Adj. R^2=.024

pling process for this data intended to provide a relatively representative sample in order to draw conclusions about the German population as a whole.

Before analyzing the data, several initial steps had to be completed. For this analysis, a rather small number of the variables were used. All of the data were analyzed using SPSS. The hypothesis in question is that Christians, those with low education levels, and a mid to low socio-economic classification will tend to exhibit more negative attitudes to immigrants. Because of the limitations of the data, it was not possible to measure attitudes toward Turkish immigrants in particular because the survey questions apply to all immigrants in general; however it is safe to assume that most immigrants in Germany are of Turkish descent (see previous discussion of immigrant percentages as noted by Razum et al. and Kirkwood). Many of the variable values needed to be recoded in order to represent an accurate analysis. It was common for the EVS data to be recorded on a scale that included

Table 2. Explaining the Variance of German Citizens' Preparedness to do Something for Foreigners.

	Beta	*p*
Religious Denomination	-.086	.000*
Sex	.017	.431
Age	-.011	.646
Education Level	-.181	.000*
Interview Town Size	.000	.997

*Signicant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.

   N=2011
   R^2=.034
   Adj. R^2=.032

negative numbers. Because SPSS excludes cases when they are coded as negative numbers, these values had to be changed to prevent skewed results. For instance, one survey question recorded the religious denomination of the respondent; however respondents who indicated they had no religious affiliation were coded as a negative number. Nearly 40% of Germans in the sample answered that they were not part of a religious denomination. If these cases were excluded from the results the analysis would be distorted.

Missing data was a major problem. In order to measure how Germans felt about helping immigrants several variables were combined into one scale. Is helping immigrants a moral duty (v286); do you sympathize with immigrants (v287); is helping immigrants in the best interest of society (v288); will you help immigrants if it is in your own interest (v289); and will you help immigrants if they do something in return (v290)? Out of the 2036 respondents, only 1601–1615 answered the questions concerning immigrants. Even more astonishingly—and this was the root of the trouble analyzing the data—only 421–435 chose an answer that was valid. The majority of individuals who took the survey (approximately 78.2%) answered "not applicable."

Despite the much lower number of cases, linear regression was used to determine which variables accounted for the variance in the re-computed variable measuring the combined willingness to help immigrants (*helpimmscale*).

The results of the regression were disappointing. The only variable that was statistically significant was the religious denomination of the respondent. This test only explained a minute 2.4% of the total variance (*adj. R^2=.024)*.

Not willing to give up on more analysis, another variable was tested to determine if the data supported the hypothesis of this article. This variable (v279a_de) had the potential to be a good indicator of the attitudes of German citizens toward immigrants. The variable explanation *Bereitschaft, etwas für Ausländer etwas zu tun* (Preparedness to do something for foreigners) could be a good indicator of attitudes of Germans towards foreigners in the country. The advantage of this variable, unlike the previous test, was that nearly all the respondents (2011) provided a valid response. Use of this variable widened the measure of attitudes to include not only those individuals living in Germany as guest workers, naturalized citizens, and so forth, but also every individual associated with a foreign group or ethnicity in Germany, regardless of time spent there.

The results of the two tests were similar; the reported religious denomination of the respondent was still a significant predictor of preparedness to do something for foreigners. Similarly, sex, age, and size of the town where the interview was conducted (our measure of relative rural/urban) were not significant in explaining preparedness to do something for foreigners. However, unlike the last test, the highest education level of the respondent was a significant predictor. In addition, although the R^2 scores for the two tests were similar (.036 versus .034), the gap between the *adj. R^2* had closed significantly. This may be attributed to the larger number of cases in the second test.

Results

What can one conclude based on these tests? Based on the results, many of the hypotheses of this paper have been rejected. First, the hypothesis that a lower socioeconomic status results in significant negative opinions about immigrants must be rejected. In both tests socioeconomic status of the respondent played little to no roll in predicting the attitude of the average German toward immigrants, neither did gender, or age, which is surprising considering that older Germans remember the creation of the guest workers program and may feel threatened by the changing demographics in Germany.

The factors that do seem to describe German attitudes toward immigrants are religion and highest education level of the respondent; although, with both of these variables, the results were puzzling. First, the relationships between religious denomination and both of the dependent variables were negative, meaning as the value for the dependent variables rose, the value of the religious denomination fell. A higher score on the variable *helpimmscale* translated into more willingness to help immigrants. The lower the score on religious denomination the more agnostic or atheist the respondent. According to the test, atheists, agnostics, or those who do not associate with any religion are, in general more likely *not* to be willing to help immigrants. By the same token, the second test results were very similar. A lower score of preparedness to do something for foreigners was associated more with atheists, agnostics, and those who do not associate with any religion. This result is contradictory to the hypothesis posed by this paper. It was hypothesized that Christians would generally hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants based on the fact that the majority of immigrants are Muslim. Religious differences and feeling threatened by a growing Muslim population *did not* translate into low Christian support for immigrants. This result is unexpected because all the evidence points to Christian resistance (see discussion of the Swiss minaret ban above).

When the highest education level of the respondent was regressed with *helpimmscale* the results of the test were not significant. This suggested that education was not a good predictor at determining an average German's willingness to help immigrants. However this result, unlike the results for religious denomination, was not similar to the outcome of the second test. In the second test, the highest educational level of respondent was a significant predictor in determining the average German's preparedness to do something for foreigners. The relationship between highest level of education and preparedness to help foreigners was negative, meaning as the score of preparedness to help increased, the score for highest level of education decreased. In the second test, the results appear to support the hypothesis. As the level of education falls—the less education an individual has—the more likely that the respondent is not prepared to do something for foreigners. One explanation for this result is that individuals with higher education tend to be more progressive with regard to immigration laws, while individuals with less education are more conservative and are generally not in favor of immigration but prefer to maintain a close-knit national identity. However, it cannot be ignored that when education was used as a predictor in the first test, the results were not significant. This, along with the low R^2 score in both tests, suggests that these results should be viewed skeptically. More conclusive data should be collected and analyzed before any conclusion about the true relationship between education and attitudes towards immigrants can be made.

Conclusion

Much more research is required to determine the attitudes of Europeans toward immigrants. What factors describe the majority of the variance in these tests? When we discover them, what significance will the findings have on the immigration debate? Europeans are undergoing an identity crisis. What will it mean to be European if Muslims become the majority by 2050? Turkey's pending ascension to the European Union has only exacerbated this identity crisis.

The immigration debate in Europe will most certainly be embedded in international headlines for the next few

decades. In the meantime, it is important for social scientists to keep studying the complex dynamics between nationality, geography, ethnicity, and how these factors affect the relationships inside and outside sovereign states. Some authors suggest that we are moving into a period of postnationalism, where nationality is no longer tied to geography; others disagree (see Baban, 2006).

The future of Turkey and the European Union is also uncertain. As long as Europeans feel that their way of life is threatened by immigrants, there is little chance that Turkey, or any other Muslim state, will gain entry into the European Union in the near future. But with exploding Muslim and other immigrant populations, it will not be long before these minorities will not be able to be ignored and will have the power to shape policy through democratic pressure. Europeans must find a way to be proud about their ethnicity while accepting immigrants. At the same time, pride for European States by their citizens must also undergo a radical change. It is possible to be a patriotic German Muslim. Of course, there are legitimate concerns about the violent temperament of some minorities. Democratic values should be protected appropriately. Native Europeans must not fight hate with hate, but instead, must pave the way for improved relations between all ethnic and national groups. Europe is undergoing a crisis of self identity, but with careful defense of Western values and respect for others, they will adapt.

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Notes

1. I would like to thank all those who contributed to this paper by offering suggestions, encouragement, and support.
2. The online catalogue number for this data set is ZA3778.
3. Naturally, the views of ZACAT, the Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, or the European Value Study Foundation have not been expressed in any way by the analysis of this paper. The author bears complete responsibility for the conclusion and interpretation.

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The Drug Bust Heard 'Round the World:
A Fantasy Theme Analysis of *Tulia, Texas*

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ABSTRACT: *In 1999, a covert drug sting in Tulia, Texas, resulted in the arrest of 46 individuals, 39 of those African-American. This action sparked national media attention as claims were made that the incident was merely a target on the black community of Tulia, further segregating the town into conflicting factions. In 2008, the documentary* Tulia, Texas *was released. It documented both sides of the situation and gave a platform for the oppressed voices to share their narratives on the historical events. Through this critique, I analyze* Tulia, Texas *using Ernest Bormann's method of fantasy-theme criticism to identify the themes and overall rhetorical vision created. By doing so, an image of continuous battling groups is evident, showing two completely contrasting views on the same situation framed by racism and prejudice. These contradictions create an image of a town that is still torn by conflict, hindered by the past and unable to move on to the future.*

A tattered billboard on a desolate patch of Texas Highway 27 between Lubbock and Amarillo displays a message that attempts to convince drivers of prosperity amongst the barren landscape: "Tulia: The richest land and the finest people." Clearly constructed in times of agricultural successes, this roadside message seems to be at least half wrong. The land appears to be decaying, a product of neglect and economic hardships among the rural communities nationwide. When looking at the second claim, "the finest people," a clear contradiction of the view that was broadcast across America in the late 1990s arises. This west Texas town's reputation was shattered when issues of racism and classism began to plague the headlines of national media, targeting Tulia as one of the most racist towns in America. This issue, highly disputed to this day, was a direct result of the war that was happening at that time. This war was not being fought overseas, but in neighborhoods across America. Labeled as "the war on drugs," the United States vowed to eradicate the problem of narcotics that was posing threats to the domestic security of the nation (Check, 1995).

Originated in 1989 by President George H. W. Bush, this "war," consisted of $7.9 billion that would be split up between law enforcement, jails, education, reinforcement, and prevention. However, the majority of the funds (70%) would directly be funneled to those catching the criminals instead of those helping prevent further spread (Check, 1995). The federal government, in turn, began to threaten federal funding if states did not comply, step up, and fight on the front lines of this disastrous war. However, the problem lay in the fact that the Commander in Chief didn't target the drug kingpins, but merely focused on the smaller players in this game—often leading the authorities into minority-heavy neighborhoods. Bobo and Thompson (2006) unveiled one of the resulting pitfalls of the war on drugs:

> In our second round of surveys we asked a national sample of blacks and whites a series of three paired statements about the War on Drugs. The first asked whether drug laws are enforced fairly on all would-be drug users or are enforced unfairly against black communities. Sixty-six percent of blacks said "unfairly against black communities" as compared to just 21 percent of whites. In the second set of paired statements, 51 percent of blacks said that "drug use would not be such a problem if government officials did not somehow benefit from it," as compared to only 29 percent of whites. Most whites (71 percent), however, endorsed the view that "drug use would be a much worse problem without current government antidrug policies," a view shared by 49 percent of blacks. And in the third set of paired statements, 1 in 4 blacks endorsed the statement that "the war on drugs is just an excuse for the police to harass and imprison inner-city youth," a view accepted by only 5 percent of whites.   (p. 461)

This research makes clear that the tactics and motives behind the declaration of war had results that were far from the original intentions. This article analyzes the documentation of one pitfall of the war on drugs in a small

west Texas town. By analyzing the documentary *Tulia, Texas* using fantasy theme criticism, I strive to identify the contrasting shared views of two opposing groups within the town to ultimately identify the rhetorical vision created by the documentary.

Historical Background

In light of the Bush administration's declaration of the war on the drugs, many small communities began to seek help to fight the battle. Accepting grant money to help offset the costs, Tulia sheriff, Larry Stewart, was no different than many surrounding area officials. However, Stewart sought out the criminals in an unusual manner (Herbert, 2002). Stewart hired Tom Coleman, a former law enforcement officer, to go undercover and seek out those who were catalysts for Tulia's alleged narcotics problems. In 1998, Coleman began his role posing as an ex-convict with an addiction to cocaine (Leung, 2004). He was issued a birth certificate, social security number, background history, and disguise to submerge himself fully as T. J. Dawson (Herman & Whalen, 2008). His 18-month investigation was complete with an early-morning raid that arrested 46 individuals who Coleman claimed sold him powder cocaine (Gewertz, 2006). Of those 46 individuals, 39 were African Americans, imprisoning 13% of Tulia's adult black population (Leung, 2004). The local media was tipped off in advance to this early-morning spectacle and was quick to document the 46 individuals in their bewildered state, many of them pulled out of their beds and paraded one-by-one to police cars (Herbert, 2002). In the days following, local media praised Coleman's actions; the town's newspaper sported the front-page headline "Tulia's streets cleared of garbage" (Leung, 2004). Residents rested in peace knowing that their town was drug free due to the noble actions of undercover agent Coleman. Soon after, the Attorney General of Texas named Coleman the outstanding officer of the year, applauding his actions in Tulia as being moral and just (Leung, 2004). However noble this act may have seemed, the facts, when viewed closely, showed this operation as anything but.

Slowly, speculation of the events in Tulia arose as defendant after defendant denied any association or knowledge as to who T. J. Dawson was. When the defendants' identities began to come into light, though, many doubted their drug dealing status bestowed on them by Coleman.

The case grew more disturbing as the identities of the defendants became clear. Most were poor, either unemployed or semi-employed. None of them owned their own house or even their own car. A man named Joe Moore, identified as a "drug kingpin," turned out to be a 57-year-old African-American pig farmer living in a shack. None of these facts seemed to jibe with what had been alleged by the narcotics agent. (Gewertz, 2006, p. 2)

The white residents of Tulia, though, kept strong convictions about Coleman, believing that he did the right thing for the right reasons—pledging full faith in their sheriff for hiring the most qualified man for the job. Coleman's word was accepted as truth even though he never once used a wire or had witnesses to these drug sales; however, according to Texas law, the uncorroborated word of a cop is all one needs to be locked away (Gewertz, 2006). As the trials began, the convictions became quick and harsh, pinning defendants with sentences from 60 to 300 years of prison (Herbert, 2002). Those awaiting trial watched in horror as Coleman's word was taken as the absolute truth. Many chose to take plea bargains in order to avoid these ruthless sentences, knowing that other options would land them behind bars for much longer.

As this event began to divide the already racially segregated town of Tuila, more inconsistencies began to surface. Above all, individuals wanted to know what this town of 5,000 individuals was doing with 46 alleged drug dealers—to whom exactly were they dealing (Gewertz, 2006)? Furthermore, was the drug problem in Tulia really confined strictly to one sector of their populous—the lower-class minorities? These initial questions sparked a defense team, headed by criminal defense attorney Jeff Blackburn, to analyze the facts and find the truth behind this operation (Herman & Whalen, 2008).

Among the inconsistencies, Blackburn and his team discovered multiple contradictions in the documentation of the crimes. Among those inconsistencies was Tonya White, an African-American woman who was charged with selling Coleman $190 worth of cocaine on October 9, 1999 (Leung, 2004). White claimed "that's not possible because I was at the bank in Oklahoma City at 9:45 a.m. withdrawing $8. And they got my signature on my withdrawal slip" (Leung, 2004, p. 2). In another case, Coleman claimed he bought the narcotics from individuals on days that his timesheets say he was not working. Although inconsistencies began to pile up, the defendants continued to be convicted with few dismissals due to inexcusable alibis. However, as Blackburn and his team

began to pull out the facts of Coleman's flawed past, justice finally turned an ear in their direction.

Months later, in a court hearing of the appellate court of Texas, Coleman's testimonies were reviewed. They were labeled as "absolutely riddled with perjury," pinning him as "the most devious, non-responsive law enforcement witness this court has witnessed in 25 years on the bench in Texas" (Leung, 2004). Sentenced with merely probation and a ban in the field of law enforcement, Coleman got off much easier than his prey. Still today, though, the issues of the drug sting of 1999 are a hidden subject on the streets of Tulia. These events further divide the town into those who see Coleman's action as justified and those who see injustice. Regardless of the lens through which you view the situation, a clear contrast in opinions can be seen.

Description of Artifact

The artifact I analyze through this critique is *Tulia, Texas*. This 56-minute documentary was directed and produced by Cassandra Herrman and Kelly Whalen. Beginning in 2002, Herrman and Whalen worked for five years on the documentary with 14 taping sessions with those directly involved with the Tulia incident (Phillips, 2008). Premiering in March of 2008 at the South by Southwest film festival in Austin, *Tulia, Texas* began its tour across the country in order to spread the message of this hidden story. The film aired on PBS's "Independent Lens" series in the 2008–2009 season (Phillips, 2008). In September of 2008, *Tulia, Texas* had its closest geographical screening to Tulia on the Canyon, Texas campus of West Texas A&M University. Many viewers present at this premiere were shown in the film, and their opinions were strongly felt on and off the screen. Herman and Whalen's intentions were not to give a black eye to the town of Tulia by rehashing old issues, but to show that an event of this magnitude can happen anywhere in America.

The noble element of this documentary lies in the fact that the narration is given by individuals who were directly involved with the events in Tulia. Unlike many documentaries, Herrman and Whalen chose not to interject their opinions beyond the editing process. The documentary ultimately serves as a semi-balanced portrayal of the emotions and opinions of Tulia's interpretation of the events surrounding the famous drug bust.

Through this analysis, I limit my critique to only the testimonies presented by the residents of Tulia. Although there were many key players involved in the famous Tulia drug bust that aren't residents of Tulia, it is ultimately the Tulians that are formulating the rhetorical views on this

situations and, in turn, the only ones still living with the consequences and results of this historic event. Although this documentary does a successful job at including adequate narratives from all sides, inside and outside of the Tulia city limits, it is ultimately those Tulia residents that are the central focus of this analysis.

Methodology

The method of criticism I use to analyze the documentary *Tulia, Texas* is that of fantasy theme criticism. Fantasy theme criticism seeks to "provide insights into the shared worldviews of groups" (Foss, 2009, p. 97). Ernest G. Bormann created this method of criticism by generating off of the small group study conducted by Robert Bales (Foss, 2009). Bales realized a group's tendency to fantasize or dramatize perceived situations as a primary communication medium (Foss, 2009). Through Bales' work, Bormann and Bormann (1972) characterized individuals' tendency to alter both their verbal and nonverbal patterns as the fantasy unfolded.

> The tempo of the conversation would pick up. Members grew excited, interrupted one another, laughed, showed some emotion, forget their self-consciousness. The members participated in the story with the sorts or responses that were appropriate. If the person telling the story was trying to be funny, the others laughed; if the person was serious, the others' verbal comments and nonverbal responses would be of the suitable tone. The group obviously tuned in to the fantasy. (p. 307)

Bormann took this behavior discovered by Bales and extended it through his symbolic convergence theory (Foss, 2009). Symbolic convergence theory is rooted in the assumptions that communication creates reality and that an individual's symbolic meanings converge to form a cohesive view of reality (Foss, 2009). Through further works, Bormann began to expand on this theory to create an overall sense of fantasy themes through his theory and related terminology.

The occurrence of one fantasy spawning from another presented within Bales' work creates a fantasy chain. After a group participates in multiple fantasy chains, they begin to form their own group culture, creating a similar mindset and belief of their surroundings (Bormann & Bormann, 1972). These chains consist of dramatized accounts of events that are apart from the present setting. Often, the participants are reflecting on the past or specu-

lating about the future, envisioning characters, locations, and events that can be separated from the moment of shared fantasy chains (Bormann, 1972).

The concept of fantasy chains conceptually make up the idea of a fantasy theme. A fantasy theme, therefore, is created by a cluster of chains that reoccur within a given group's communication (Bormann, 1972). Furthermore, it is the critic that formulates what fantasy themes develop due to the clustering of chains. Once a critic recognizes apparent chains within a group, the fantasy themes can evolve. Bormann (1972) further explains this process of discovering fantasy themes:

> When a critic has gathered a number of dramatic incidents he can look for patterns of characteristics (do the same people keep cropping up as villains?) or dramatic situations and actions (are the same stories repeated?) and of setting (where is the sacred ground and where the profane?). (p. 401)

From this investigation, the concept of character themes, action themes, and setting themes arise. By interpreting the fantasy themes present within the given artifact, the critic can begin to formulate the overarching rhetorical vision the rhetor is attempting to present. It is within this rhetorical vision that outsiders (not linked into the shared fantasy chains) can begin to study the given group's point of view more clearly.

Sonja Foss (2009) suggests that fantasy-theme criticism may be accomplished in two steps: coding the artifact, and construction of the rhetorical vision. Through the first step, the critic must analyze the artifact and identify key words or phrases that pertain to the three major genres of themes (Foss, 2009). Through coding, the critic seeks to find recurring themes that play a significant role in the artifact. The second step is for the critic to construct the rhetorical vision (Foss, 2009). Through this step, the critic groups the coded words or phrases into themes to better understand the rhetor's shared fantasy-themes (Foss, 2009). It is the critic's job to link the action, setting, and character themes to create a cohesive understanding of the artifact's world views (Foss, 2009). It is through this method of criticism that a particular societal view that outsiders may observe as absurd, giving clarity to the unknown.

Analysis

Using Bormann's method of fantasy theme criticism, I follow the two steps Foss lays out to successfully analyze the artifact. Initially, I identify the prevalent themes present in the testimonies of the Tulia residents to finally construct the rhetorical vision the rhetors wish to create. When looking at these testimonies, an evident contradiction of themes among the two battling groups is apparent.

This critique does not intend to draw lines between the testimonies of blacks and whites in Tulia, for the coding process does not include *who* said what, but rather only *what* was said. Although the town has been divided because of this issue, a clear line between races has not been drawn for there are individuals of every race that have taken poistions on either side. Through this analysis, however, I wish to distinguish the concept of competing narratives. There were ultimately two groups in Tulia, those who supported the drug bust and those who were against it. Through the primary events, the dominant voice present was that of those individuals who rejoiced in the actions taken by Jeff Blackburn, suppressing the competing narratives that saw the negative implications of this event. This dominant narrative was prevalent partially because of the marginalization of those being punished as well as the backing of law enforcement officials on the subject. This created a distinct power struggle between the competing voices, hoping to have their narrative heard by outsiders. As the events progressed and the competing narratives gained momentum from outside media and legal help, the battle between two opinionated sectors of the Tulia community began. There were six prominent themes the rhetors focused on through their interviews.

Dominant Narratives
Integration. The major mindset held by the dominant group prior to the 1999 drug bust in Tulia saw the town as integrated and possessing limitless opportunity for those who desired to succeed. During continuous instances in the documentary, the dominant group attempted to convince the audience and themselves that the setting for this incident was not one of prejudice or inequality, attempting to remove the black eye of racism with which the South is branded. Numerous statements of Larry Stewart, Tulia's sheriff, attempted to neutralize the stigma around his community.

We care for, very deeply, about the whole community, not just a segment of it. Tulia was integrated well over 40 years ago. We have people of all races living in every part of town. This community is open to anyone who wants to make something of themselves.

<div align="right">(Herman & Whalen, 2008)</div>

This idea of a limitless possibility is one that Stewart firmly hangs onto throughout the course of the film, never straying from the notion that Tulia is far from an oppressing community. Through his statements, "we" becomes the active character theme, assuming the role of representing the town of Tulia as a whole. Through this representation, Stewart assumes the identity of both blacks and whites, rich and poor within the setting themes, "community" and "Tulia". In turn, the setting and character themes reference the same concept, becoming a reinforcement of the ideal that the town itself is merely comprised of the people it is made up of. The action themes within Stewart's fantasy are "care for," "have people of all races", and "is open to anyone." This sense of a liberated, free land creates an air of integration far from the stereotypical view of an oppressive west Texas. The uniqueness to this particular fantasy theme in itself is the fact that the individual who is speaking on behalf of the community is a strong player in helping create the initial conflict to begin with. It is this sense of blind representation that lacks the acknowledgement of the possibility of bias within the community, ultimately creating a false sense of reality as a lens to view the world.

Justice. The theme of justice is prevalent throughout the narratives of the Tulia residents. This idea of justice revolves around the idea that Tom Coleman's actions were completely motivated out of unwavering confidence that he was sold drugs by these 46 individuals on the reported dates. Sheriff Larry Stewart states, "I think this story is simply about a community doing its best to do what they believe is right" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). Stewart goes on to say, "We felt like we did a good job. We felt like we did what the citizens here wanted us to do" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). These two statements from the sheriff create a mindset that the citizens had preconceived notions and expectations of the results of the drug sting, claiming this action to be not only legally just but also to be justified in happening under the contexts it did. Tulia resident Charles Kiker explains one man's actions on the matter saying, "One of the men in that Sunday school class, who would later be the jury foreman for one of the trials, said they're all guilty and they're scumbags and we need to get them off the street" (Herman & Whalen,

2008). This feeling of a justified action encompassed the dominant group, communicating the idea that this action was the only resolution to the drug problem in Tulia. The character themes all revolve around key players in the arrest and conviction of the defendants: "community," "we" (law enforcement), and "the jury foreman." All three played crucial parts in the legality of this situation. The setting themes all lie within the confines of the town: "here" (Tulia) and "Sunday school." The latter represents the importance of the opinions on this situation. Discussions of the matter began to crop up in religious venues across the community, showing one fantasy chain shared by the men within that conversation. The action themes revolve around the idea of doing the right thing: "do what they believe is right," "did what citizens here wanted us to do," and "said they're all guilty and they're scumbags." This notion of a justified action feeds off the idea of the three relatable themes—the characters in the setting were just in action.

Defensiveness. The power of the dominant group greatly shifted throughout the course of the procedure. Because the competing narratives began to generate a voice and outweigh the opinions and actions of the dominant group, there had to be a defense as to how they would justify actions that now seemed unjust. The route the dominant group decided to take did not accept the argument that the actions of the legal system were flawed and unjust, however, they defended the actions of Coleman and his teammates in the situation. As two unnamed men reflect on the events surrounding the pardoning of the conviction over a cup of coffee, an evident sense of anger is intertwined with their rhetoric.

> MAN 1: I thought it looked like a Barnum and Bailey's circus down there myself. Those lawyers, I don't think that they cared about the people they helped get out of prison and stuff. They wanted to embarrass the county, embarrass the drug enforcement people.

> MAN 2: I have known our county sheriff for 25 years or longer. He's not a racist. He made a mistake—we all make mistakes. If he runs for sheriff tomorrow, I'd vote for him again. We never got rid of the drugs. I think they'll be back in jail for another crime within the year.

<div align="right">(Herman & Whalen, 2008)</div>

The character themes view "those lawyers" as the enemy, claiming that their work had no "[care] about the people they helped get out of prison" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). Likewise, they viewed the sheriff as the hero, be-

ing the noble foreman of this endeavor who went astray. Through these quotations alone, the defensive quality resonates clearly in this conversation. This notion of defending an action that one supports even after it has been deemed wrong remained prevalent through many Tulians' mindsets. Throughout the documentary, Sheriff Stewart continues to justify the actions of Coleman even with the obvious flaws in the documentation.

> As far as Ms. White, the only thing that I can tell you about that is that, I assume that there was a mix-up on dates on reports or something of that nature. I don't believe that's enough to bring his credibility into question.
>
> (Herman & Whalen, 2008)

The character themes point to Ms. White and her actions to merely be a "mix-up" on the reports. This character, action and setting, as stated by the sheriff, encompasses the idea of protecting the actions of the community by giving a reasonable explanation of the inconsistencies in the paperwork. Furthermore, one Tulia resident attempted to play the victim after being involved in one of the pardoned cases as a jury member, "For the first time, I would go into a store and a black would see me and, instead of smiling and saying hi, would glare at me like they hated me" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). This notion of turning the victimization from the apparent victims onto oneself became a prominent theme in the once dominant narratives. "A black" becomes the character theme through this account as "glare at me like they hated me" becomes the action in the setting of "a store" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). This defense takes the voice of a dominant group member and alters it into the role of the victim, viewing the situation as being one where she is suffering, not those who are being marginalized. This defense stems from the root of defeat, proving their ideas of integration and justice to be inherently flawed.

Competing Narratives

Segregation. The contrasting fantasy theme to the dominant group's notion of integration is the competing narrative's claim of segregation within Tulia, stretching back before the drug bust occurred. Many residents reflect on their initial impressions of the drug sting to ultimately show the preconceived notions of particular segments of the Tulia community. Charles Kiker said, "We looked at the addresses and it was all from 'Blacktown', so we knew that there had been a raid on 'Blacktown'" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). This idea of a "Blacktown" screams segregation on its own, giving the setting theme true power

through the statement. The character "we" and action "looked at the addresses" merely play a supporting role to the term used to describe the setting. Furthermore, Kiker continues to expand on the idea of the social lines drawn within the community.

> To say that blacks are integrated into Swisher County . . . is simply not the truth. I would say to go visit the banks and see how many black tellers there are, visit the county offices and see how many black employees there are other than custodial help, and then draw a conclusion.
>
> (Herman & Whalen, 2008)

Ultimately, Kiker states that the characters (blacks) in the setting (Swisher County) are not integrated, creating the shared themed of a segregated society. Through the elaboration on his first sentence, Kiker continues to reiterate this idea of separation. Likewise, Freddie Brookins Sr., the father of one of the defendants, adds to this notion of segregation.

> Before the sting, Freddy was an employee, just like many of the young blacks here. When my children were in high school, they would seek employment, and they would constantly tell us "Dad, they won't hire us."
>
> (Herman & Whalen, 2008)

This narrative ultimately supports Kiker's earlier quotation. "My children" become the character and their information of rejection serves as the action within the setting of Tulia. This narrative gives a personal account to contradict the claims of the dominant voice. Within the opening scene, Brookins summarizes his standpoint through a sentence explanation of the events that unfolded. "This is a story about a town who wants to send a message to the black community" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). The character and the setting lay in the "town" where the action was "to send a message to the black community," a community that was apparently separate from the rest.

Injustice. The notion of justice that was formed in the narratives of the dominant group is highly disputed through the testimonies of the competing narratives. This form of injustice lies in the initial action of the drug sting, not the end result of the release of the defendants. As noted earlier, those who quickly crossed the racial barriers that were evident before helped play a pertinent role in the amplification of the competing narratives. Gary Gardner reflects on his initial response during the unfolding events in Tulia.

I was the first white guy that said, in public, this is wrong. There was so much animosity against the blacks that had been arrested. And what I took offense at was that the district attorney and the sheriff, they was walking around, beating themselves on the chest like Tarzan. They were basically trying everybody in public.

(Herman & Whalen, 2008)

There are many notions of injustice portrayed in this narrative. Initially, Gardner sets himself as the first character under the setting of "in public" and the action of saying "this is wrong." The added fact that Gardner was a white man crossed the boundary lines of a marginalized group unreasonably claiming injustice. Secondly, Gardner portrays the characters of the "district attorney and the sheriff" as "walking around . . . like Tarzan" in the public setting. He goes on to say that these same characters are "trying everybody" in the same setting. This shows the unjust actions of those who claim to be working for a just society, contradicting not only their stance but also the notion of innocence until proven guilty. These narrations of injustice slowly began to lever the competing narratives into the spotlight of media attention to gain them the results and attention they desired.

Endurance. The final fantasy theme the competing narratives formulate is the overall feeling of endurance in the face of adversity. Through each testimony within the documentary, regardless of the trials the given character faced, a desire to move on and continue life normally was prevalent. Freddie Brookins Jr., one of the imprisoned defendants, reflects on life after incarceration and release.

What gets me up every morning is knowing that I have to get out and provide for my family. I've been working at the meat market in the grocery story. This is where I'm at and I've got to try to make the best of it.

(Herman & Whalen, 2008)

This overarching idea that the character ("I") must fulfill the action ("try to make the best of it") in order to truly move on develops an enduring quality that gives Brookins the desire to leave the discrimination and hatred behind for a better future. Brookins further explains his state of mind within the situation.

When I was first released, my dad told me that there is no way in the world to move around in this world if you can't look deep in your heart and forgive these people for what they have done. Even if they haven't came and asked you for their forgiveness.   (Herman & Whalen, 2008)

Simply, Brookins represents the character within his father's advice to fulfill the action to "forgive these people for what they have done." Through this advice, Brookins shows his reasoning to not reflect the dominant group's abrasive, defensive attitude, but that of returning back to normalcy. Similarly, another released defendant, Michelle White, resounds the enduring notion as she says, "Life goes on. We're still trying to make it and survive and do what we have been doing" (Herman & Whalen, 2008). The characters are encompassed through "we" while the actions reflect their desire to continue with an ordinary life, unaffected by the unjust actions of the past. This notion of endurance uplifts this competing narrative to ultimately formulate a positive outcome from the negative, vastly contradicting the opposition's desire to continue defending mistakes of the past.

Rhetorical Vision

In order to observe fully the rhetorical vision presented within the documentary, it is crucial first to acknowledge the given rhetors within this artifact. Although the main focus of this analysis is on the words spoken by the residents of Tulia, the overarching rhetors are the directors and producers of the documentary, Cassandra Herman and Kelly Whalen. It is through their process of editing and decision making that ultimately created this platform for these narratives to be heard. Through this, we can see a clear strategy and rhetorical vision created by the rhetors.

The concept of two differing opinions presented within a group of people display the notion of battling narratives—an apparent vision the rhetors wished to create. This documentary could easily present only one side of the story, but through Herman and Whalen's decisions to include both support and opposition to Coleman's actions, a more realistic vision of the situation is given. Furthermore, this rhetorical vision polarized members of the community to support either one side or the other. By presenting the two extremities, the rhetors gave the audience the most conflicting narratives on which to base their vision of Tulia. This method creates a sense of how much impact this event had in this small community is created.

When viewing the concept of the dominant and competing narratives, the rhetors ultimately help amplify the oppressed voices by presenting their story that often goes unheard. From the beginning, the dominant group gained its power through the media's attention, reporting a drug bust that would put Tulia, Texas on the map. The footage of the defendants being handcuffed

and walked to the police cars amplified the dominant narrations because it presented the stereotypical drug user being locked away, the goal of President Bush's war on drugs. However, it was also the media who began to broadcast the inconsistency in the evidence—creating a platform for multiple views of the issues on a local and national level. Through the artifact, the rhetors clearly acknowledged the media's role in this situation, giving the rhetorical vision of the media's power to reveal the inconsistencies of the judicial system that caused this controversy in the first place.

Conclusion

The war on drugs, regardless of numbers that might prove otherwise, was ultimately a policy bomb that negatively affected more people than it intended. This policy that was intended to make America a safer place only left deeper scars than the drugs could create. Tulia, Texas is merely one example of the flaws of this policy. It is apparent that these implications are irreversible, polarizing many communities and causing them to return to the prejudicial mindsets of the past.

Through the documentary *Tulia, Texas*, these issues are adequately brought into light. In west Texas communities the story of Tulia is one that has long faded and often forgotten, intentionally or unintentionally, by individuals who were closely impacted by it. Although the situation is no longer commonly discussed, the results are still evident, and through this documentary, those results and reasoning are brought back into light. By analyzing *Tulia, Texas* using fantasy-theme criticism, apparent contradictory views of two opposing groups are easily identifiable to create an overall rhetorical vision of continuous conflict even after the verdict has been read. It is this conflict that marks Tulia as still being a community where prejudice and segregation thrive long after the days where those qualities were banished from the American way of life. Perhaps the sign welcoming individuals into Tulia shouldn't read "the richest land and the finest people," but rather acknowledge the hardships this town has endured and pledge that travesties like this will never

happen again. It is not until Tulia attempts to correct the actions of the past that a "rich" and "fine" future can truly happen.

Implications for Further Research

When looking at the possibilities of the expansion of this research, many options are available. By using the documentary as a catalyst for the subject matter, extended research could seek to view the Tulia communities' opinion of the rhetorical strategies presented within the film. Because this documentary seeks to present Tulia in a light that does not stray from the facts, I would like to talk to both sides of the situation in order to fully view their reaction to the facts and testimonies that were presented. Through focus groups, a better understanding of the rhetors' rhetorical vision, as compared to the actual reality vision, can be understood. Furthermore, an expanded research of the legal documents presented within the trials could help understand the background knowledge and credibility of the situation. Also, by examining this film as a rehashing of past events, a study on the revival of conflict due to the media attention would garner analysis on the effects of the film more so than the content within.

Moving away from a rhetorical analysis of film, another route would be to analyze the communication tendencies of those living in Tulia now to see how much the events of the drug conflict truly impact their day-to-day lives. By seeing if this conflict still creates tension between races, it would become a broader study that would not be limited to the confines of the narration presented within the documentary. This could be established through focus groups with members of the Tulia community form various areas of the town to ensure that a variety of ideas and opinions are represented.

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Perceptions of Nature, Indigenous Peoples, and Questions of Identity: A Comparative Historical Analysis of Russian and American Frontier Settlement Policies upon the Rise of Modern Environmental Movements[1]

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ABSTRACT: *Although driven by vastly different ideologies, both capitalist America and Czarist-Soviet Russia wrought devastating environmental effects. In particular, the frontier regions of the United States and Russia were subject to rampant environmental exploitation of water resources, nuclear testing, mining, and other activities. However, each region also witnessed the genesis of nature and environmental movements that became somewhat mainstream in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This essay explores the reasons why each frontier region was subjected to exploitation and how that exploitation led to the birth of a conservation ethic. Further, this essay explores the common ground that explains how and why these different societies produced an ecological consciousness that currently shapes environmental protection and policy in their respective countries. Specifically the paper explores the links between economic systems, science, philosophy, and cultural identity as possible explanations for the evolution of nature protection.*

Introduction

Although driven by vastly different ideologies, both capitalist America and Czarist-Soviet Russia have wrought devastating effects upon the environments of each respective country. The frontier regions of the United States and Russia have been particularly subjected to rampant environmental exploitation in terms of water diversions, nuclear testing, mining, and other activities. Further, though the indigenous people of each region have been marginalized, they have also played important roles in the emergence of modern environmental movements that have emerged in these frontier regions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

This essay will explore the reasons why each nation's frontier regions were subjected to exploitation and how that exploitation led to the birth of a conservation ethic. Specifically this analysis will examine the links between economic systems, the treatment of indigenous and marginalized peoples, and cultural identity as possible explanations for the evolution of modern American and post-Soviet style nature protection and its connections to each society's respective frontier region. Finally, this essay will seek to find common ground in an attempt to explain how and why these two divergent societies pro-duced the current ecological consciousness that is currently shaping environmental protection and policy in the United States and former Soviet Union.

First I will define several parameters that will be used in this comparative analysis. I will refer to frontier America as the trans-Mississippi west, exclusive of Alaska and Hawaii, and will examine this period between 1803, the date of the Louisiana Purchase, and 1890, the year the frontier closed according to historian Frederick Jackson Turner. Although the settlement of Alaska was influenced by many of the same ideologies that drove the settlement of the trans-Mississippi west, Alaska is also a unique place because it can be considered a frontier region of both cultures, and thus it was not shaped solely by the ideas of one or the other. Accordingly, Alaska will be excluded from this analysis. I will also focus on the pre-Soviet period of Russia's eastward expansion between 1462–1796 that coordinates with the reigns of Ivan III, (1462–1505), Ivan IV (1533–1584), Peter the Great (1689–1725), and Catherine II (1762–1796), because it is during this period that Russia moved into the trans-Ural, Ukrainian, and Siberian frontiers. I will not include Russia's westward expansion towards Europe because it lacks the characteristics of a frontier region, and because various European powers had contested this land for centuries. It is during this 334-year period that the greatest

geographical expansion of Russia occurred and the ideological principles that drove this and future Soviet expansion developed (MacKenzie & Curran, 1991).

Ultimately I will compare the similarities and differences of the forces that drove frontier expansion in each society and how the regions incorporated by these expansions have given rise to modern environmentalism in America and Russia respectively.

Background

The story of America's westward expansion is well known, so I will but briefly outline the process and the ideologies that drove it. Although for the purposes of this discussion, I have defined America's frontier region as the trans-Mississippi west, one must recognize the linkages between this later period of expansion and the settling of the eastern United States. The English colonists who settled on the Atlantic Coast of North American came there for a variety of different reasons. Some, as in the case of the Virginia Company, sought to make a profit from the environment of North America, and in the case of Jamestown they eventually succeeded; failing at first to discover gold or other valuable commodities, the residents of Jamestown began to cultivate tobacco, which by the middle of the seventeenth century had proven to be a valuable commodity. However, tobacco production exhausts the soil and thus westward expansion became inevitable as residents of the Chesapeake sought to open new lands for cultivation. This desire to force the land to turn a profit would constitute a key component in the expansion of the United States into the trans-Mississippi (Morgan, 1975).

The profit motif alone does not explain adequately America's westward expansion. When one examines the colonies of New England one can see that religious motives played a major role in the settlement of that region. John Winthrop and his Puritan followers sought to establish a "city on a hill" as a beacon of true Christianity to the rest of the world. Winthrop, upon encountering Indian villages that had been decimated by diseases such as smallpox, proclaimed that God himself had given the Puritans title to the land. However, New England's colonists also sought to turn a profit from lumber, fur-trapping, and other natural phenomena (Cronon, 1983). Thus in each region of early Colonial America, British perceptions of native peoples and nature's bounty would drive the direction that cultural collisions and environmental exploitation would take two centuries later.

After the acquisition of the Louisiana territory in 1803, the United States government sponsored several expeditions in order to ascertain the human and natural resources of the newly acquired territory of the trans-Mississippi. Lewis and Clark, Zebulon Pike, John C. Fremont, and others explored the west and brought back extensive records of the region's timber, water, and mineral resources, while trappers such as James Ohio Pattie, also pursued fur bearing animals and added colorful accounts of sometimes questionable veracity to the public knowledge of the frontier region. By the mid-nineteenth century Congress had set in motion the forces that would eventually draw hordes of settlers to the west by authorizing the surveying of four transcontinental railroad routes and passing homestead laws. The first waves of Anglo settlers into the trans-Mississippi region were spurred onward by tales of gold and silver strikes in California and Nevada, and they were followed closely by loggers and cattlemen (White, R., 1991). Thus the first industries in the American West would be based upon the utilization of natural wealth by individuals intent upon private gain. Political power would inevitably concentrate into the hands of people who viewed the western environment as something to be exploited rather than preserved.

However, there was more to America's westward expansion than simply the desire to acquire wealth. By the mid nineteenth century, two ideological motives had also ensconced themselves into the American consciousness. The first, called Manifest Destiny, was based upon the belief that God had sanctioned the expansion of the United States across the North American continent, the antecedents of which one can discern in the Puritan colonies of New England. Closely intertwined was the belief in Thomas Jefferson's idea that the United States should become an agricultural utopia. The combination of Jeffersonian Agrarianism and Manifest Destiny constituted the ideological foundation upon which Congress would justify taking land from its indigenous inhabitants on one hand, while granting it through statutes to homesteaders seeking to carve small farms out of the frontier region, and railroad companies and extractive industries on the other (Limerick, 1988). Many environmental historians contend that a variant of Manifest Destiny also drove environmental exploitation because of the Biblical admonition contained within the book of Genesis 1: 28 where God instructed humankind to "subdue" the earth (White, L., 1969). By 1890, the date that historian Frederick Jackson Turner deemed the frontier closed, driven by the desire to turn a profit and justified by religious and ideological ideas, the extractive industries of the United

States had utilized techniques such as hydraulic mining, clear-cutting, and overgrazing to precipitate far-reaching environmental devastation in the American West.

Our discussion of Russian frontiers begins with the expansion eastward that occurred during the latter phase of the Muscovy period. Prior to the reigns of Ivan III and Ivan IV, Muscovite rulers had waged a constant struggle for survival and succeeded in breaking free of the domination of the Mongols between 1452–1480. As the old Mongol Empire broke up, Moscow began a period of expansion driven by three motivating factors. First, Ivan III who ascended the throne in 1462, sought to create a buffer zone between Muscovy and the Mongols to the east by extending the power of the emerging Russian state. In so doing he expanded Muscovy into the northern Urals region to the east and conquered parts of modern-day Ukraine to the southeast.

Second, Ivan III was driven by religious motives as well. Historians of Russia argue that Moscow had become the religious capitol of Russia by 1328, long before the expansion of Muscovy. The role of the church in Russia's expansion cannot be overstated. By the end of the 15th century, the Russian Orthodox Church controlled vast tracts of land and millions of peasants. Additionally, the church had spearheaded efforts to colonize the eastern wilderness by building monasteries far to the east of the recognized boundaries of Muscovy. The Russian church's perceptions of self importance grew as a result of the fall of the seat of Eastern Orthodoxy, Constantinople, to the Turks in 1453. Seeking to preserve the "true" Eastern Orthodox faith, Church clerics formulated the doctrine of the "Third Rome," articulated by Philotheus of Pskov in 1510. He argued that Rome had fallen because of the Catholic "heresy," Constantinople to "infidels" and Moscow—the third Rome—was to remain as the seat, defender, and advocate of the "true" Christian faith. Thus, a spiritual element entered into Russian expansionism (Riasoanovsky, 2000).

Finally, Ivan IV (the Terrible) established tentative links to the west for the purposes of trade, and the Tsar invited doctors, artists and craftsmen from Germany to serve him. More importantly, Muscovy established direct relations with the British who were permitted to trade through the port of Archangel. This increase in trade led to the rise of an important mercantile family, the Stoganovs, who obtained permission from the Tsar to establish industries in salt extraction, furs, and fish beyond the Urals in Siberia. Additionally, Ivan IV also continued his grandfather's expansion to the east and north by destroying and absorbing the republic of Novgorod, which controlled the roads leading to the White Sea, Baltic, and to the trans-Ural region, bringing a vast area rich in raw materials into the Muscovy fold. Thus under Ivan III and Ivan IV, Russia had gone from a relatively small fiefdom centered in Moscow to a huge state with an expansionist agenda driven by perceptions of nationalism, religious fervor, and the desire to obtain raw materials with which to engage in international commerce (Riasoanovsky, 2000; Yanov, 1981).

With this ideological foundation laid, Russia embarked upon the exploration of Siberia and the far-east. Between 1580–1650 the Russian frontier moved three thousand miles east to the Pacific Ocean (Dmytryshyn, 2000). As with the American westward movement, the vanguard of the Russian advance was led by explorers and individuals seeking to exploit the natural resources of the region. However, these expeditions, which can be compared loosely with American expeditions such as Lewis & Clark, Fremont and others, differed in that they were regulated tightly by the Russian sovereign. Fur trading especially remained under the purview of the Russian government because of its importance in international commerce. As Russia expanded into Siberia, the crown imposed a tribute, or *iasak*, to be paid in furs upon the native peoples brought under its control, and created a bureaucracy designed to prevent the private acquisition of wealth (Riasoanovsky, 2000).

The reforms of Peter the Great (1689–1725) also had a tremendous impact upon the development of extractive industries in the Ural and Siberian frontier regions. After the disastrous defeat of the Russian army at the battle of Narva in 1700 during which it lost all of its artillery, Peter, with visions of continental, and even global conquest, sought to expand Russian heavy industry in order to prepare for future wars. Consequently, Peter recruited metallurgists from Western Europe and invested huge sums of money into state-sponsored exploration and development of heavy industry in the Urals and Siberia. As a result, eleven vast ironworks initiated production between 1702–1707. Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russian utilization of its eastern environment was now driven primarily by preparations for war under Peter the Great (Anisimov, 1993).

Laws and Regulations

Spawned from diametrically opposed systems of government, the movements into the frontier regions of Russia and United States gave rise to differing systems

of regulations designed to control the utilization of the environment and collisions with indigenous peoples. A comparison of the regulatory schemes reveals much about the political ideologies and economic systems of Russia and America respectively. The Russian state tightly regulated fur traders and mining companies, thus remaining the principle recipient of the wealth extracted from Siberia. American fur trappers on the other hand engaged in their exploits for private gain and were seldom subjected to regulations anything like those imposed upon their Russian counterparts. Likewise, American laws governing mineral and water rights were often enacted based upon local customs that had become the *de facto* means of resolving disputes. In the area of water rights, for instance, the American West saw the evolution of the doctrine of prior appropriation, which is based upon the idea of "first in time first in right," whereby if one arrived first the water was theirs to use so long as the use was "beneficial." The Mining Act of 1872 made it relatively easy for individuals and corporations to stake claims to the west's mineral resources and to acquire land for a nominal fee. So although individuals and extractive industries played important roles in the development of the natural resources of the frontier region of each country, they did so within vastly different political, economic, and regulatory frameworks.

The expansion of Russia also brought Russian culture into collision with indigenous people in the trans-Ural region. Russian incursions initially precipitated great unrest among the native peoples of the east, as the Eastern Orthodox Church sought to extend its influence by forcing indigenous people to convert despite nominal Czarist policies to the contrary. Beginning in the 16th century, and greatly accelerated under Peter the Great, the state tried to reduce the power of the church by reducing monastic landholdings and transferring peasants to state service. The logistics of imposing these new state regulations in the east led to great confusion and conflict between church and secular authorities, with the peasantry caught in the middle. As a result Russia grappled with numerous uprisings within its eastern frontier region, perhaps most clearly illustrated by the Pugachev revolt of 1773–1774, during the reign of Catherine II (the Great) that briefly threatened the stability of southern and southeastern Russia (Raeff, 1970). Its frontier region in chaos, Russia's monarchs in the 19th century attempted to bring a degree of pacification to their conquered subjects. In 1822, Russian statesman Mikhail M. Speranskii instituted a set of regulations that are remarkably progressive in their treatment of indig-

enous peoples. These statutes divided the indigenous peoples of Siberia into three groups: "settled peoples"; "nomads who live in specific regions"; and "migratory peoples who are constantly on the move" (Dmytryshyn, 1990, p. 230).

Indigenous people who engaged in settled agriculture and who converted to the Russian Orthodox religion would be considered as equal with any Russian of a corresponding social caste, which in most cases constituted a peasant. However, and remarkably, given the perception of self importance held by the Russian Orthodox church, those who refused to convert were allowed to practice their own religions and were also viewed as the equivalent of state peasants except that they were exempted from military service. This is probably due to the decline of Church power that began under Peter the Great. Cossacks constituted a special group within the settled agriculturalists and were allowed to retain their own code of law and administration, as well as their religion. Settled agriculturalists also were allowed to hold onto their ancestral properties and even permitted to claim additional land (Dmytryshyn, 1990).

These regulations also gave nomadic and migratory groups a great deal of elasticity. They were not forcibly incorporated into the caste of peasant, but given what is in essence, freedom of religion. The only restriction upon these groups appears to be the continence of tribute payments and some restrictions regarding on which lands they could engage in herding and agriculture. Nomads were to be tried in Russian courts of law for crimes while civil disputes were to be settled according to local custom. Likewise, migratory peoples were granted extensive tracts of land to use for hunting, granted freedom of religion and were exempted from paying taxes to the crown (Dmytryshyn, 1990).

Despite these statutory guarantees of indigenous rights and obligations, Russia still sought to quell native uprisings, and the bureaucracy created to govern its far-flung empire was cumbersome to the point to futility. In 1864 the minister of foreign affairs, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, issued a policy statement on the difficulties of these cultural collisions, that is remarkable because of the historical parallels one finds with U.S. government pronouncements on Indian policy:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organization . . .

In order to put a stop to this permanent state of disorder, fortified posts are established in the mist of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of submission. But other more distant tribes beyond this outer line come, in turn, to threaten the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of repression. The state is thus forced to choose between two alternatives: either to give up this endless labor and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, or to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries when the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance.

> Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India; all have been forced by imperious necessity into their onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know when to stop. (Krausse, 1988, p. 224–25)

Thus, the Tsars attempted to incorporate indigenous peoples of the eastern frontier region into the Russian body politic by promising them relative political, cultural, and religious autonomy in exchange for their agreeing to recognize the supremacy of the sovereign and to contribute a portion of what they produced to the state.

In America the treatment of indigenous people has been characterized by contradictory policies virtually since the founding of Jamestown in 1607. Initially, in Virginia, Native Americans were viewed as a monolithic bloc, and some, such as the Powhatan tribe, were driven from their lands in the Tidewater, resulting in numerous bloody clashes. However, by the mid-seventeenth century, a reservation system had been established in Virginia, the historical antecedent of the system in place at the present. Colonial administrators distinguished between these reservation Indians and "hostiles" in the frontier region. In New England, Anglo merchants and traders attempted to incorporate American Indians into the market economy to facilitate the trade in furbearers and other raw materials, while other colonists waged war against the various New England tribes so that by 1700, indigenous people no longer constituted an obstacle to the settlement of New England (Cronon, 1983).

For the next 250 years until the 1960s, American Indian policy vacillated between assimilation, extermination, and the creation of reservations to isolate Native Americans so that they could be "reformed" and "Christianized." Although generalizations are risky at best, one can find two common threads linking American Indian policies: first, they are founded upon the Anglocentric premise that native cultures are somehow inferior, and second, that many if not all American Indian polices were designed either overtly or through subterfuge, to separate Native Americans from their land. Perhaps the best articulation of this idea is captured in the words of one 19th century proponent of assimilation who stated that reformers sought to "kill the Indian [and] save the man." As such, American policy makers have initiated programs to destroy Indian cultures by outlawing the practice of tribal customs and religions, and by attempting to privatize tribal lands, in order to introduce "selfishness" into Indian society (Calloway, 1999). With the passage of the Indian New Deal in 1934 the trend was somewhat reversed, however, the Termination policy of the 1950s precipitated the taking of still more land. It was not until the 1960s that courts began to uphold Indian resource claims and to preserve cultural autonomy. Although historians such as Frederick Jackson Turner and politicians acknowledged the integral role the "savage" Indian frontier enemy played in the development of America's national character, the United States, unlike Russia, has made little attempt to preserve the ancestral lands and uphold the cultural integrity of the indigenous people of its former frontier regions.

However, this is not to suggest that Tsarist Russia was a place of individual autonomy when compared with the United States. Although it is true that within the United States certain groups of people have been exploited and marginalized—American Indians and Africans are but two examples—the United States has never engaged in the wholesale subjugation of virtually its entire populace that characterized the Russian imperial period. Indeed between the reigns of Ivan III and Catherine II, Russian autocrats progressively imposed greater and greater degrees of control upon individuals. Only after the freeing of the serfs in 1861 was there even a temporary relaxation in this state control, which of course evaporated with the Russian Revolution of 1917. Historian Theodore von Laue contends that under Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet state accomplished to a greater degree that which escaped even Peter the Great: the imposition of discipline and collectivization upon the Russian people to such a degree that it virtually enslaved them to the state. As a result, the Soviet Union represents continuity with the imperial past, not a break from it. Soviet Russia became a global superpower just as imperial Russia had progressed along the same path—by exploiting its greatest natural resource: its people. Consequently, although great environmental disasters occurred during the Soviet period, such as the

great Kazakhstan plow up of the 1950s, the draining of the Aral Sea, and the threats to Lake Baikal; these can all be viewed as the incidental result of the Soviet struggle to compete with western industrialization by exploiting and marginalizing the Russian populace on an unprecedented scale (Von Laue, 1971; Worster, 1979).

In contrast, there has not been state-sponsored exploitation of the majority of the population of the United States. The United States has risen to its status as a superpower due to the machinations of a (more or less) free people, in pursuit of private property and wealth, working within a capitalistic system, which places economic considerations above everything else. Historian Donald Worster contends that capitalism is the "decisive factor in this nation's use of nature." One can contend that the environmental destruction wrought by overgrazing, hydraulic mining, and the cultivation of marginal lands that has occurred in the old trans-Mississippi frontier region is the result (Worster, 1979).

Perhaps the only common factor driving both Russian and American exploitation of their frontier regions is the Cold War. The United States tested its first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1945, and conducted 935 tests of atomic and nuclear weapons at the Nevada Test Site between 1947–1992. Russia initiated its atomic bomb program in Kazakhstan and exploded 496 atomic and nuclear devices there between 1949–1990 (Norris & Arkin, 1998). In each case the state deemed these former frontier regions appropriate places to conduct environmentally destructive tests, and the result is that people of Kazakhstan and the Southwestern United States live with the legacy of cancer and gene mutation due to exposure from radioactive fallout. Marginalized land and marginalized people exist in each former frontier region, as the result of imperialist, Soviet and capitalistic exploitation, ideology, and competition.

The Emergence of Environmental Advocacy

Yet powerful environmental movements have emerged from these marginalized lands that have addressed a broad range of issues ranging from the preservation of natural phenomena to public health. Furthermore, these environmental movements have also been driven by deeply held philosophical concerns about the preservation of national identity in the case of both the United States and Russia. In the United States, Thomas Jefferson and others sought to distinguish American civilization from Europe by extolling the virtues of the American environment

and its molding effect upon American character. At the beginning of the twentieth century, president Theodore Roosevelt echoed these sentiments by advocating that Americans pursue the "strenuous life," and he set aside vast tracts of land as national forests, and national parks and monuments. The National Park Service, created in 1916, initially oversaw the parks as tourist attractions, but by 1940, Park Service Director Newton Drury began to articulate a different vision for the national parks, especially the crown jewels such as Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Grand Canyon, located mostly in the former frontier region of the United States. In 1942, with Grand Canyon threatened by the potential construction of hydroelectric dams, Drury drew the line at the boundaries of Grand Canyon National Park and succeeded in mobilizing a constituency of environmental groups in opposition. Drury argued that the national parks constituted sacred space that should be held inviolate because he believed that if these last remaining vestiges of American wilderness were destroyed then American culture would be severed from its foundations which were deeply rooted in its western frontier environment (Pearson, 1999).

Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, struggling to break free from the idea that development and the preservation of the parks were somehow reconcilable, took up Drury's crusade, and in the 1950s and 1960s fought epic battles over threats to Dinosaur National Monument, Grand Canyon, the preservation of redwoods, and other environmental crusades centered around natural phenomena located mostly in the trans-Mississippi West. Capturing the poignancy of 1960s style environmentalism at the beginning of the Grand Canyon dam controversy, Sierra Club executive director David Brower wrote the following:

> Glen Canyon died in 1963 and I was partly responsible for its needless death. So were you. Neither you nor I, nor anyone else, knew it well enough to insist that at all costs it should endure. . . . The best of the canyon is going or gone. Some second best beauty remains along the Colorado of course but much of its meaning vanished when Glen Canyon died. The rest will go the way of Glen Canyon unless enough people begin to feel uneasy about the current interpretation of what progress consists of—unless they are willing to ask if progress has really served good purpose if it wipes out so many of the things that make life worthwhile. . . . Progress need not deny to the people their inalienable right to be informed and to choose. In Glen Canyon the people never knew what their choices were. Next time in other stretches of the Colorado, on other riv-

ers that are still free, and wherever there is wildness that can be part of our civilization instead of victim to it the people need to know before a bureau's elite decide to wipe out what no men can replace. (Porter, 1963, p. 5–7)

Brower characterized rampant water development by the Bureau of Reclamation as a denial of American democracy. This portrayal resonated with the public, who, in a massive grass roots protest at the height of the Civil Rights, Free Speech, and Anti-War movements, sent hundreds of thousands of letters to Congress protesting the proposed Grand Canyon dams. And in an ironic twist, American environmentalists, seeking an alternative model to industrial capitalism and environmental exploitation, adopted Native Americans as representing an alternative, environmentally conscious culture, the very people American capitalism and the westward expansion driven by it had marginalized for most of American history (Krech III, 1999).

Russian environmental protection first emerged as a result of the establishment of protected nature preserves called *zapovedniki,* by scientists with the approval of the Romanov rulers during the latter part of the 19th century. These nature reserves constituted space that was to be held "inviolate" so that scientists could study evolution and other ecological developments. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, as the new communist state sought to stamp out all forms of dissent, according to historian Douglas Weiner, the *zapovedniki* constituted an "archipelago of freedom" within the Soviet sea of repression. Viewing the scientists as harmless "nature kooks," the Soviet state tolerated their existence, and they remained free to conduct scientific research, maintained foreign contacts with the western scientific community, and even established professional societies that prided themselves on the retention of democratic procedures. These scientists successfully resisted Soviet attempts to open the *zapovedniki* to exploitation until the 1950s when Stalin decreed that the reserves should be opened to development. Even then, and in the face of consequences absent from western environmental struggles, these scientists continued to defend these sacred spaces, and sought the reestablishment of their inviolate status under Brezhnev, and eventually succeeded in preserving many of these reserves in a pristine state (Weiner, 1999).

However, in defending the *zapovedniki,* the scientists did more than just preserve natural laboratories for ecological inquiry. In setting aside these tracts, Soviet scientists also preserved fundamental elements of Russian national identity. The Russian people historically have viewed the Taiga forest, steppes, and in particular, waterways and lakes, as foundational elements of their very essence as a people. During Stalin's tenure, the Soviet Union initiated a series of gargantuan water projects, including the Moscow-Volga Canal, the reversal of the Dnieper River, and the White Sea Canal, the construction of which took the lives of an estimated 120,000 slave laborers. During the 1950s, Khrushchev planned massive water projects for the Siberian forests and northern rivers in an attempt to replenish the water levels of the Aral Sea. Speaking for the Russian people, based upon almost 1,000 years of historical and folk tradition, the educated "intelligentsia," including writers and poets, rose up in protest against these projects. According to Weiner, the most objectionable aspect of these projects, "was their threat to Russian villages, and historical monuments . . . progress and modernity now threatened the spiritual home" of the Russian people. The scientific community and intelligentsia focused upon projects including a paper and pulp mill planned for Lake Baikal in the 1960s, the deepest lake in the world, and a place of almost unimaginable beauty and importance to Russian cultural identity. Although these protests ultimately failed, and the industrial plants planned for Baikal went on line, the struggle forged a link between Russian writers and the scientific community and provided a foundation for future, more public environmental demonstrations which would take place in the era of Glasnost (Weiner, 1999).

The plans to reroute northern rivers such as the Ob and Enisei, mired for years in Soviet bureaucracy, were approved in 1976, and studies moved forward so that construction could begin. When the Soviet government released the economic justifications for these proposals in 1983, scientists and writers launched public protests in which the theme of national identity was sounded again and again. In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986, environmental writers publicly attacked the projects at a national conference in June. Weiner quotes Iurii Bondarev who perhaps best captured the public outrage of the Russian people, marginalized and exploited by the state for more than half a millennium, who viewed these and other environmental desecrations as threats to their national character:

> If we do not stop the destruction of architectural monuments, if we do not stop the violence to the earth and rivers, if there does not take place a moral explosion in science and criticism, then one fine morning, which will be our last . . . , we with our inexhaustible optimism will wake up and realize that the national culture of great Russia—

its spirit, its love for the paternal land, its beauty, its great literature, painting, and philosophy—has been effaced, has disappeared forever, murdered, and we naked and impoverished will sit on the ashes trying to remember the native alphabet . . . and we won't be able to remember, for thought, and feeling, and happiness, and historical memory will have disappeared. (p. 426)

Responding to this withering attack, virtually unprecedented in Soviet history, Mikhail Gorbachev and the rest of the Politburo, cancelled the most noxious elements of these projects on August 14, 1986, opening the floodgates for massive environmental protests over the destruction of nature and especially public health issues during the Gorbachev era.

Conclusion

The trans-Mississippi frontier of the United States and the trans-Ural, and Siberian frontiers of Russia have been subjected to like degrees of environmental exploitation despite the fundamental differences in the economic and political systems of each respective state. In the United States, individual and corporate greed constituted the motivating factor, as private individuals and business sought to wring a profit from the natural bounty of the region. Russian environmental exploitation is also due to greed of a different sort, greed of the elites who used the apparatus of the state to eliminate individual profit taking from the eastern frontiers and to exploit virtually the entire populace as though it was just another natural resource which, to Russian leaders, both imperial and Soviet, it in fact was.

Russia and America have treated their indigenous people far differently, and the comparison is only partially conclusive because of the differences in how each state treated their populace as a whole. While Russia incorporated the indigenous people of the frontier into the populace that the ruling apparatus had marginalized, throwing them a bone by allowing them some cultural autonomy, America until recently and in response to legal challenges by its indigenous people, has denied cultural autonomy, and kept American Indians marginalized apart from the populace as a whole.

Yet these marginalized people have played an important role in the rise of modern environmental movements in Russia and America. In the case of Russia, the "volk" represent the true Russian identification with the natural world, and provided the inspiration for scientists, writers and other members of the twentieth century "intelligentsia" to rise in protest over the threatened destruction of Siberian waters and forests. In America too, environmentalists have linked the American character and cultural identity with the natural world. The natural wonders of the west have become a powerful symbol of who we are as a nation and American Indian societies have been adopted as an alternative model for coexistence with the natural world by many environmentalists.

Ultimately, the common link between Russian and American environmentalism is not based in ideology or oppositional economic systems. It is based upon the collective consciousness of the people who, though laboring within different political systems, found the means to articulate that the continuing destruction of the Earth, either by capitalistic, communistic, or imperialistic machinations, constituted a threat to their own cultural identity as Americans and Russians. In articulating these fears, they have perhaps instinctively sounded a warning for all humankind: that if we continue to destroy the earth, we will, in the end, destroy ourselves. Whether humanity is listening is a mystery only the passage of time can solve.

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Notes

1. The author presented an abridged version of this essay at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association held in San Francisco, California on January 6, 2002.

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Constitutionally Defining Marriage in a Non-Presidential Election Year: A Study of the Vote in Two States

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abstract: *In 2004, voters in thirteen states approved amendments to their state constitutions defining marriage as involving one man and one woman. The process of states adding marriage definition amendments to their constitutions continued with voters in two states considering the issue in 2005. This paper examines the political context of the voting outcomes in those two states, Kansas and Texas. It analyzes the influence of religion on the county-level votes for the marriage definition amendments, controlling for various political, demographic, and socioeconomic variables. The analysis reveals that while religious affiliation was an important fact in the political environment, the relationship between support for marriage definition and the 2004 Republican presidential vote was more important. The analysis also exhibits evidence that counties with large African-American populations strongly supported marriage definition amendments.*

Constitutionally Defining Marriage in a Non-Presidential Election Year: A Study of the Vote in Two States

Same-sex marriage became legal in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on May 17, 2004, the result of a judicial decision. Reacting to that event and what many believed to be a movement toward allowing same-sex marriage in other states, voters in 13 states approved marriage definition amendments to their state constitutions in 2004.[1] The process of adding marriage definition amendments to states constitutions slowed slightly in 2005 with voters in only two states, Kansas and Texas, considering such amendments.

Using a method similar to the method used by Morgan and Meier (1980) in their study of voting on moral issues in Oklahoma, this paper examines the voting patterns on the question of marriage definition in the two states that considered the issue in 2005, seeking to build on research on the 13 states that voted in 2004 (Rausch, 2005). Morgan and Meier used multiple regression analysis to study the county-level vote on several ballot questions. Their dependent variable was the percentage of each county's voters supporting the question. They used a number of independent variables including rural isolation, socioeconomic status, liquor consumption, and three categories of religion. They found that support for referenda on liberalizing liquor and gambling laws was found in Oklahoma counties with high socioeconomic status, a larger percentage of Catholics, and smaller per-

centages of both fundamentalist and other Protestants (Morgan & Meier, 1980; Satterthwaite, 2005a). Despite the relative simplicity of the method and the level at which the data are aggregated, Morgan and Meier's findings have been cited numerous times, especially on questions related to issues of morality (see Gibson, 2004; Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; LeDuc & Pammett, 1995; Oldmixon, 2002; Satterthwaite, 2005a, 2005b; Wald, Button, & Rienzo, 1996; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990).

Several hypotheses emerge to explain support for marriage definition state questions. One hypothesis posits that votes on marriage definition were determined by religious affiliation. Public opinion research demonstrates that religion has an influence on opinions about homosexuality (Cochran & Beeghley, 1991; Cotten-Huston & Waite, 2000; Finlay & Walther, 2003; Glenn & Weaver, 1979; Roof & McKinney, 1987), although Cadge, Olson, and Harrison (2005) show that religious affiliation may not specifically affect opinion on allowing same-sex marriages.

A second hypothesis considers the role of political party in the vote on marriage definition amendments. A growing body of research (Campbell & Monson, 2005; Donovan, et al., 2005; Hillygus & Shields, 2005; Smith, DeSantis, & Kassel, 2005) links the success of President George W. Bush's re-election campaign with the state-level votes on marriage definition. This line of research supports the public opinion data that emerged out of the 2004 presidential election indicating that voters chose President Bush largely because he reflected their posi-

tions on moral issues, including gay marriage. The challenge, recognized by Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel (2005), lies in identifying the number of Democratic and Republican party identifiers at the county-level, especially in states that do not register voters by party. Rausch (2005) found that the best predictor of county-level support for marriage definition amendments in the 2004 votes was a measure of political party support based on the percentage of a county's vote for the Republican candidate in the 2004 presidential election.

A third hypothesis considers the urban and rural populations in a state. Voters in rural areas are more likely to vote in support of marriage definition amendments while those in urban areas would oppose the measures (Haeberle, 1996; Wald, Button, & Rienzo, 1996). There has been little research on locality as a factor in voter outcomes on marriage definition amendments, except that some research includes "rural and urban" as variables (see, for example, Smith, DeSantis, & Kassel, 2005). Examining Ohio and Michigan, Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel (2005) find that rural counties were significantly more likely to support the marriage definition measure in Ohio in 2004.

Using data collected from a variety of sources, the present research assesses the alternative hypotheses while testing for other explanations of support for state constitutional amendments defining marriage. Data were collected on each of 358 counties in Kansas (105 counties) and Texas (253 counties[2]). The two states have different political cultures allowing for some control over political tradition.

History and Politics of Marriage Definition

The campaigns to add a definition of marriage to the Kansas and Texas constitutions were a continuation of a process that reached its high point in 2004 (see Rausch, 2005). Amending state constitutions have been dramatic points in a decades-long conflict over the ability of same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses (Barclay & Fisher, 2003; Cadge, Olson, & Harrison, 2005). In 1970, the first gay male couple applied for a marriage license from Hennepin County, Minnesota. After the county clerk denied their application, they sued in state court. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the men had no federal due process or equal protection right to marry (*Baker v. Nelson*, 1971). A number of same-sex couples tried to obtain marriage licenses during the 1970s and 1980s and failed in court (Dupuis, 2002).

Gay marriage entered the national political agenda in the early 1990s when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the state's ban on granting same-sex couples marriage licenses violated the equal protection clause found in the Hawaii Constitution (*Baehr v. Lewin*, 1993). This decision was upheld by a Hawaii appeals court in 1996. During the period between the two decisions, same-sex marriage opponents organized. The opponents were able to persuade the Hawaii Legislature to propose a state constitutional amendment that was ratified by 69% of the state's voters in November 1998. In 1996, while several states were debating same-sex marriage, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defining marriage as an institution between a man and woman. The legislation prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages and permitted each state to ignore same-sex marriages performed in other states. President Bill Clinton signed the bill that was followed by similar legislation in a number of states.

The next legal action occurred in Vermont in 1999. The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Vermont Constitution's "Common Benefits Clause" (*Baker v. State*, 1999). The decision forced the Vermont Legislature to develop a way for benefits and protections to be applied to same-sex couples. In 2000, the legislature passed a "civil unions" law, granting to same-sex couples "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in marriage." This was the first legislative measure to provide the benefits and protections of marriage without the label of "marriage."

Same-sex couples received additional support for their ability to obtain marriage licenses with the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health* (2003). The court ruled "the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection." The first same-sex marriage licenses were granted in Massachusetts on May 14, 2004, over the objection of Governor Mitt Romney, a Republican.

Reacting to these court rulings and events like San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's granting of marriage licenses in his city in February 2004, conservative groups increased their efforts to amend state constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. Voters in thirteen states approved these amendments in 2004. Litigation has been filed in a number of these states seeking to overturn the

amendments. In 2005, voters in Kansas and Texas also approved constitutional amendments defining marriage.[3] The present research assesses the political context of the voting outcomes on these referenda.

The Amendments in Kansas and Texas

The constitutional amendments decided by voters in Kansas and Texas in 2005 were quite similar. The Kansas amendment defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman and denies "the rights and incidents" of marriage to any other relationship, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships. Numerous observers indicated that the amendment was one of the more severe to be considered in any state since it banned civil unions as well as same-sex marriages. The proposal passed the Kansas House and Senate with the required two-thirds majority. It did not need the signature of Democratic Governor Kathleen Sebelius. Governor Sebelius questioned the need for a constitutional amendment defining marriage since Kansas enacted a Defense of Marriage Act in 1996.[4] The amendment was approved with 70% of the voters supporting it on April 5, 2005.[5]

In Texas, voters considered the marriage definition amendment along with a relatively short list of constitutional changes on November 5, 2005. The amendment, which was approved by a two-thirds majority in the Texas House and the Texas Senate, defined marriage as the union of one man with one woman and prohibited the state or any political subdivision from creating or recognizing "any legal status identical to or similar to marriage."[6] Governor Rick Perry, a Republican, took the unusual and constitutionally unnecessary step of signing the bill at an "evangelical school," Calvary Christian Academy, in Fort Worth.[7] Groups opposed to the measure were able to fund a fairly strong campaign to defeat the amendment. The opponents' tactics included calling voters to suggest that the amendment actually would abolish marriage.[8] The amendment was approved with the support of 75% of the voters.[9]

Method

Data to test the hypotheses that the way voters in Kansas and Texas voted on marriage definition referenda was guided by religious affiliation, by political party, or by residence in rural areas, were collected from a variety of sources. This study employs aggregate data collected at the county level. While individual-level data collected by a survey would be preferable to county-level data, the level of aggregation I have chosen is more practical for a study that includes a number of states. County-level data are useful for examining the political, economic, and social environment in which voters made their decisions on referenda (Giles, 1977; Hero, 1998; Key, 1950; Morgan & Meier, 1980; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000; Rausch, 1994; Satterthwaite, 2005a, 2005b; Smith, DeSantis, & Kassel, 2005; Tolbert & Hero, 2001).

Election return data were collected from the Kansas and Texas Secretaries of State. The data on religion were compiled from the Glenmary Research Center's *Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States, 2000* (Jones, 2002). Demographic data are from the United States Census.

Measures

Support for Marriage Definition Amendment

The dependent variable, support for the marriage definition amendment, is measured by the percentage of voters in each of the 358 counties who cast a ballot in favor of the marriage definition amendment. While the statewide votes on the question appear to have little variation, the county-level data exhibit greater variation. The highest percentage of "Yes" votes was 95.41 in Martin County, Texas. Floyd County, Texas, was a close second with 95.37%. The strongest support for marriage definition in Kansas was the 91.15% of the voters in Wichita County who favored the amendment. The lowest support was 37.12% in Douglas County, Kansas. Only 40.06% of the voters in Travis County, Texas supported the amendment. The mean county vote was 84.77% with a standard deviation of 8.12%. Using Census data available at www.gaydemographics.org, no statistically significant relationship was found between the number of same-sex couples in a county and its level of support for marriage definition, as suggested by Overby and Barth (2002).

Religion

Data were collected on the proportions of county residents affiliated with different religions. Although religion has been involved in American political life for a long time, social scientists have only seriously researched the role of religion in politics for about the past quarter century (Jelen, 1998; Satterthwaite, 2005a, 2005b; Wald, Silverman, & Fridy, 2005). Jelen (1998) reviews much of the literature that specifically examines the role of religion in political behavior. For example, the Catholic

Church has worked in coalition with other groups to enact restrictions on abortion at the state level (Day, 1992; O'Hara, 1992). Religious conservatives became actively involved in the Republican Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s to advocate their positions on a number of social issues (Guth, 1983; Oldfield, 1996). Interestingly, it was during the period when religious conservatives began to strongly participate in politics that social science experienced a growth in interest in the role of religion in American politics. Recent research has found that religious affiliation played a role in the results of the marriage definition amendment votes (Cadge, Olson, & Harrison, 2005; Campbell & Monson, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2005b; Smith, DeSantis, & Kassel, 2005). Religious groups were well organized in both Kansas and Texas to support the amendments.

The present research incorporates three variables for religious affiliation: evangelical Protestants; mainline Protestants; and Catholics. Using data from the Glenmary Research Center (Jones, 2002), the proportion of county residents who are *Evangelical Protestants* was calculated using the "List of Religious Bodies" found at the American Religion Data Archive website.[10] The percentages ranged from a high of 96.9 to a low of zero. The mean was 31.34% with a standard deviation of 18.43%. In Kansas, the range was from 2.9% to 41.8% with a mean of 17.17% (standard deviation = 8.10%). In Texas, the range was from zero to 96.9% with a mean of 37.1% (standard deviation = 18.33%).

It is expected that counties with greater percentages of evangelical Protestants will exhibit greater support for the marriage definition amendments (see Satterthwaite, 2005b). In fact, the percentage of evangelical Protestants in a county could be considered the key independent variable.

A similar procedure was used to calculate the percentage of *Mainline Protestants*. The range among all counties was from zero to 56.9% with a mean of 15.07% and a standard deviation of 10.85%. Kansas exhibited a range from 6.1% to 56.9% with a mean of 26.23% and a standard deviation of 10.90%. In Texas, the range was from zero to 49.0% with a mean of 10.46% and a standard deviation of 6.69%.

Because mainline Protestants tend to be more liberal on social issues (see Fowler, Hertzke, Olson, & Den Dulk, 2004), mainline Protestant counties are expected to exhibit lower support for the amendments. In fact, the United Church of Christ voted in July 2005 to affirm equal marriage rights for couples regardless of gender.[11] Interestingly, Satterthwaite (2005b) finds that mainline

Protestant population is positively associated with vote for marriage definition, at least in Oklahoma.

The percentage of *Catholics* in each county was determined using the Glenmary data. Only the category labeled "Catholic" was included in this classification. The percentage of Catholics ranged from zero to 94.7%. The mean was 17.01% with a standard deviation of 15.10%. In Kansas, the range was from .9% to 53.5% with a mean of 15.41% and a standard deviation of 9.28%. The Texas counties ranged from zero to 94.7% with a mean of 17.67% and a standard deviation of 16.91%. Counties with greater populations of Catholics are expected to show more support for marriage definition. For example, the Catholic Bishops of Texas issued a statement, "Marriage did not originate from either the Church or state, but from God. Therefore, we believe neither Church nor state has the right to alter the nature and structure of marriage."[12]

Political Party Affiliation

The second hypothesis examined here holds that counties with differing proportions of party identifiers will exhibit different levels of voting on the marriage definition amendments. The challenge is defining party affiliation. The present research measures party affiliation as the "2004 Republican Presidential Vote."

The mean county Republican vote for president in the 2004 election was 70.47% with a standard deviation of 11.43%. The county that provided the most support to President Bush was Ochiltree County, Texas, at 91.97%. The president received the lowest support from the voters in Zavala County, Texas, with 24.92%.

Voters in Rural Areas

The independent variable tapping the effect of residence in rural areas is the percentage of county residents who live in rural areas according to the United States Bureau of the Census.[13] For simplicity, this research uses "percent rural"; therefore, the remainder of the county population can be considered urban. It is expected that counties with a greater percentage of rural population will exhibit more support for the marriage definition amendments.

Control Variables

Additional independent variables are entered into the analysis as controls. They are the percentage of each county's population with a high school diploma, each county's median age, and the median household income in each county. The percentage of each county's popula-

Table 1. Correlations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) % Yes on Marriage Definition Amendment	1									
(2) % Evangelical Protestant	.600 (p=.000)	1								
(3) % Catholic	-.133 (p=.012)	-.418 (p=.000)	1							
(4) % Mainline Protestant	-.111 (p=.036)	-.242 (p=.000)	-.139 (p=.000)	1						
(5) % Rural	.259 (p=.000)	.113 (p=.032)	-.182 (p=.001)	.313 (p=.000)	1					
(6) % 2004 Gop Presidential Vote	.476 (p=.000)	.337 (p=.000)	-.411 (p=.000)	.373 (p=.000)	.320 (p=.000)	1				
(7) % Hs Graduate	.225 (p=.000)	.104 (p=.050)	-.326 (p=.000)	.306 (p=.000)	.443 (p=.000)	.205 (p=.000)	1			
(8) Median Age	.196 (p=.586)	.165 (p=.002)	-.284 (p=.000)	.461 (p=.000)	.627 (p=.000)	.376 (p=.000)	.564 (p=.000)	1		
(9) Median Income	-.268 (p=.000)	-.346 (p=.000)	-.227 (p=.000)	.068 (p=.198)	-.200 (p=.000)	.197 (p=.000)	-.161 (p=.000)	-.137 (p=.010)	1	
(10) % African-American	.107 (p=.042)	.185 (p=.000)	-.227 (p=.000)	-.342 (p=.000)	-.204 (p=.000)	-.288 (p=.000)	.044 (p=.000)	-.200 (p=.000)	.023 (p=.667)	1

tion who are African-American also is included in the analysis.

A Concern about Hispanic Residents and Voters

The present research does not to include a measure of Hispanic residents. This is done for several reasons. First, Census data is unable to distinguish between Hispanic residents who are American citizens over 18 years of age and those who are not. Knowing who is an American citizen and eligible to vote is particularly important since this research examines voting behavior. Second, a correlation analysis shows that the percent of a county's population claiming to be Hispanic is relatively strongly correlated with the Catholic percent, a Pearson's r of .633 (p=.000). In considering the question examined at the individual level, the national election day exit polls conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International find that the view held by Hispanic/Latino voters on the question of whether gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to marry is not much different from the view held by White Anglo voters. Of the 2,421 White voters, 26% state that gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry while 26.6% of the 267 Hispanic/Latino voters hold that opinion. About 35% of White voters believe that gay and lesbian couples should have no legal recognition in marriage. Hispanic/Latino support for this position is slightly higher at 38.2%. The data reveal that African-Americans more strongly support the position that gay and lesbian couples should not be allowed to marry (National Election Pool, 2005).

Analysis and Findings

The present research examines the political context in which voters in Kansas and Texas in 2005 approved state constitutional amendments defining marriage by prohibiting same-sex marriage. In order to allay concerns about multicollinearity and to determine if there are any potential relationships, a correlation matrix was calculated for all of the variables. This matrix is presented as Table 1.

Table 1 presents few surprises. The percentage of a county's population affiliated with an evangelical Protestant denomination is strongly correlated with the percentage of the county's voters who supported a marriage definition amendment. Rural counties also showed greater support for the amendments. The marriage amendment vote is significantly correlated with the 2004 Republican presidential vote. A surprise is the correlation between vote on the amendment and the Catholic

population. The negative correlation on the Catholic population is intriguing, suggesting that counties with larger Catholic populations show less support for the marriage definition amendments. Of course, since this research uses aggregate data, it is difficult to argue that Catholics voted against the amendments without raising the specter of the ecological fallacy. The reader also should remember that of the counties examined in this research, in only two were amendment supporters on the minority side of the vote.

The GOP vote for President in 2004 is correlated with a number of variables but not at levels to cause concern.

Multiple regression analyses were run to produce several models. The first one is presented in Table 2. This model includes all 358 counties across both states. The variables included in the first model were: percent of evangelical Protestants in the county, the percent of mainline Protestants, percent Catholic, percent rural population, the percent of voters who supported the Republican presidential candidate in 2004, the percent of county residents who graduated from high school, the median age, the median income, and the percent African-American population. The first model explains a respectable amount of the variance in the dependent variable (R^2=.624) and the model is significant.

The model clearly indicates that there is a strong relationship between the 2004 Republican presidential vote and the strength of support for the marriage definition amendments, measured by voting. The other important variable is the size of the evangelical Protestant population. Counties with more people who affiliate with evangelical Protestant denominations voted at higher rates for the marriage definition amendments. Counties with large Catholic populations also supported the amendments. In counties with larger mainline Protestant populations, support for the amendments was weaker. Age was the only variable that did not significantly contribute to the model. The model is similar to the findings reported by Rausch (2005) in his study of the thirteen states that considered marriage definition amendments in 2004.

Regression analyses were conducted on the Kansas counties and the Texas counties separately. These models are presented in Table 3. The model produced on the Kansas data appears to have less explanatory power with an R^2 of .598 (adj. R^2=.560). In Kansas, counties that supported President George W. Bush in his 2004 reelection at higher levels also were more supportive of marriage definition. Few of the other variables seemed

Table 2. OLS Regression of County Vote on Marriage Definition Amendments Across Both States.

	Beta	p
Evngelical Protestant	.380	.0001
Catholic	.303	.0001
Mainline Protestant	-.168	.001
Rural	.113	.010
2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.600	.0001
High School Graduate	.155	.0001
Median Income	-.203	.0001
Median Age	-.062	.221
African-American	.227	.0001

R^2=.624
Adj. R^2=.615
p=.0001

Table 3. OLS Regression of County Vote on Marriage Definition Amendments (Kansas and Texas Analyzed Separately).

	Kansas		Texas	
	Beta	p	Beta	p
Evangelical Protestant	.157	.044	.265	.001
Catholic	.163	.023	.211	.0001
Mainline Protestant	.048	.622	-.024	.594
Rural	.171	.076	.064	.202
2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.599	.0001	.611	.0001
High School Graduate	.218	.016	.335	.0001
Median Income	.009	.907	-.256	.0001
Median Age	-.021	.848	-.159	.006
African-American	.122	.157	.140	.004

Kansas	Texas
R^2=.598	R^2=.642
Adj. R^2=.624	*Adj.* R^2=.628
p=.0001	p=.0001
N=105	N=253

to have an effect on the county-level vote for marriage definition in Kansas. One of the challenges could be the smaller number of counties in Kansas (105) compared to Texas.

In the Texas model, we see that counties that were supportive of President Bush at high levels also were more supportive of the marriage definition amendment. Interestingly, counties with a larger percentage of

high school graduates also supported the amendment at higher levels. Counties with older residents appear to be less supportive of the amendment, an important finding because older residents are more likely to vote. The same pattern is seen in counties with higher median incomes. The Texas model predicts the variance in the vote for the marriage definition amendment better than the Kansas model (R^2=.642; *adj.* R^2=.628).

Discussion

The present research seeks to understand the political context in which voters approved marriage definition amendments in Kansas and Texas in 2005. It also builds upon previous research examining the thirteen states that considered similar amendments in 2004 (Rausch, 2005). Three hypotheses were tested. The first suggests that counties with large evangelical Protestant populations would strongly support marriage definition amendments. The second hypothesis posits that counties that voted strongly in support of the Republican presidential candidate in 2004 also would exhibit higher levels of support for marriage definition. Finally, the third hypothesis indicates that rural populations would be more supportive of such amendments.

The findings presented here suggest that there is a strong association between 2004 presidential vote and the vote on the constitutional amendments. Counties in which a large percentage of voters supported the Republican in 2004 also demonstrated stronger support for marriage definition in 2005. This association is similar to that found in the earlier research (Rausch, 2005) even though the votes in Kansas and Texas were not held at the same time as the presidential election. Evangelical Protestant population also contributed to county vote as did the amount of rural population.

The findings presented in this paper come with caveats. The data collected for this study are aggregate in nature. Examining aggregate data always raises a concern about the ecological fallacy. A second caveat revolves around the fact that the amendment received less than 50% of the vote in only two counties, one each in Kansas and Texas. The findings presented here only address the strength of support for state constitutional amendments on marriage definition.

Despite the caveats, this research presents a model of county-level voting outcomes in a political context. The next important step in the research will be to examine individual-level data available on voters who were

asked to decide the issue of marriage definition. The election day exit polls conducted in 2004, and available from The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, may be mined to provide such individual-level data. Voters in a number of states were asked to amend their state constitutions in November 2006, providing additional cases to analyze and test the models that have been built with the data from 2004 and 2005.

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Notes

1. Elizabeth Mehren, "More Backlash than Bliss 1 Year After Marriage Law," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 May 2005, p. A1.

2. Texas actually is divided into 254 counties. Loving County, sometimes referred to as "America's Emptiest County," has been removed from this analysis because of its sparse population. See Ralph Blumenthal, "1 Café, 1 Gas Station and 2 Roads: America's Emptiest County," *New York Times*, 25 February 2006, p. A11.

3. For a summary of recent state activity on same-sex marriage, see Kavan Peterson, "Washington Gay Marriage Ruling Looms," Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=20695 (last accessed on April 25, 2006).

4. Brian MacQuarrie, "Kansas Set to Vote on Gay Marriage Ban," *Boston Globe*, 4 April 2005, p. A3.

5. Suzanne Perez Tobias, Joe Rodriguez, and Steve Painter, "Kansas Vote for Constitutional Amendment Banning Gay Marriage," *Wichita Eagle*, 6 April 2005.

6. R.G. Ratcliffe, "Same-Sex Marriage Ban Going to Voters," *Houston Chronicle*, 22 May 2005, p. A1.

7. Ralph Blumenthal, "Texas Governor Draws Criticism for a Bill-Signing Event at an Evangelical School," *New York Times*, 6 June 2005, p. A12.

8. W. Gardner Selby, "Former Austin Minister on Your Answering Machine," *Austin American-Statesman*, 27 October 2005.

9. Rebeca Chapa, "Gay Marriage Ban Rolls," *San Antonio Express-News,* 9 November 2005, p. 1A.

10. http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/RCMS_Notes.asp. According to the American Religion Data Archive, their classification scheme was derived from Steensland, et al. (2000). When denominations were not included in the Steensland, et al., classification, the religious bodies were classified based on Melton (1999) and Mead & Hill (1995).

11. Shaila Dewan, "United Church of Christ Backs Same-Sex Marriage," *New York Times*, 4 July 2005, p. 10A.

12. Tara Dooley and Kristen Mack, "Religion, Politics Collide over Prop. 2," *Houston Chronicle*, 5 November 2005.

13. The Census Bureau's classification of "rural" consists of all territory, population, and housing units located outside of "urbanized areas" and "urbanized clusters." Urbanized areas and urbanized clusters are core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile and the surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people per square mile. The rural component contains both place and non-place territory. Geographic entities, such as census tracts, counties, metropolitan areas, and the territory outside metropolitan areas, often are "split" between urban and rural territory, and the population and housing units they contain often are partly classified as urban and partly classified as rural.

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